Remuneration and Risk-Taking – Empirical Evidence for Social Trading

Author(s):  
Sascha Neumann ◽  
Stephan Paul ◽  
Philipp Doering
2011 ◽  
Vol 01 (01) ◽  
pp. 169-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Phelim P. Boyle ◽  
Ranjini Jha ◽  
Shannon Kennedy ◽  
Weidong Tian

There is controversy about the relative merits of stock and options in executive compensation. Some observers contend that stock is a more efficient mechanism, while others reach the opposite conclusion. We focus on the manager's risk-taking incentives and derive an optimal compensation contract by using the concept of a comparable benchmark and imposing a volatility constraint in a principal-agent framework. We demonstrate a joint role for both stock and options in the optimal contract. We show that firms with higher volatility should use more options in compensating their executives and provide empirical evidence supporting this testable implication.


2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (6) ◽  
pp. 2796-2799
Author(s):  
Haim Levy

In theorem 1 given in my paper, “Aging Population, Retirement, and Risk Taking” [Levy H (2016a) Aging population, retirement, and risk taking. Management Sci. 62(5):1415–1430.], there is indeed a technical error. Yet, adding one condition to the theorem (which can be added in two alternate ways) is sufficient to ensure the dominance of stocks over bonds in the very long run. For the commonly employed preferences, the empirical evidence conforms with the claim given in my original theorem 1, asserting that the portfolio with the higher geometric mean (stocks) dominates the other portfolio under consideration (bonds) as the investment horizon increases indefinitely. Thus, as advocated in my paper, stocks dominate bonds for investors with typical preferences who save for retirement. This paper was accepted by Karl Deither, finance.


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