Protecting Privacy on Mobile Apps: A Principal–Agent Perspective

Although individuals increasingly use mobile applications (apps) in their daily lives, uncertainty exists regarding how the apps will use the information they request, and it is necessary to protect users from privacy-invasive apps. Recent literature has begun to pay much attention to the privacy issue in the context of mobile apps. However, little attention has been given to designing the permission request interface to reduce individuals’ perceived uncertainty and to support their informed decisions. Drawing on the principal–agent perspective, our study aims to understand the effects of permission justification, certification, and permission relevance on users’ perceived uncertainty, which in turn influences their permission authorization. Two studies were conducted with vignettes. Our results show that certification and permission relevance indeed reduce users’ perceived uncertainty. Moreover, permission relevance moderates the relationship between permission justification and perceived uncertainty. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.

The Effect of Formal Contracts, Transaction Cost, Agency Cost, Principal Agent Conflicts and Principal Agent Relationships on Village Funds Allocation in Facing the Covid 19 Crisis in Dolok Masihul District, Serdang Bedagai Regency

This study is related to the concept of public institution on principal agent relationship, namely the relationship between the Village Head and the Village Secretary in local government named Dolok Masihul. The number of villages studied were 44 respondents. Analysis statistical investigates relationship of research variable and using multiple regressions model. After analysing was known that formal contract had a significant positive effect on village funds allocation with value of 0.355. it means both head villager and secretaries had the competence and authority to carry it out, as Pascal (1997), Meinard (1997), Sarwoko (2010: 28) and Syofyan (2019). Hypothesis is accepted. Transaction costs have a negative effect and the hypothesis is rejected. Transaction costs refer to the governance structure as (Klein, 1999: 464-466), (Williamson, 1985). This result is different from the research by Syofyan (2019). Agency costs have coefficient value 0.072. It means agency cost significant to village funds. The hypothesis is accepted. Agency costs in this study are coaching and supervision that are positively related to the total allocation of village funds. This result is in line with Syofyan (2019).

Vicarious Liability Under a Strict Liability Rule

In this article, we extend the model of Newman, H., and D. Wright. 1990. “Strict Liability in a Principal-Agent Model.” International Review of Law and Economics 10: 219–231 and strengthens their result that the strict liability can attain social optimum in a principal-agent relation to the situation in which the court appreciates any contractual terms regarding apportionment of damages between an employer and an employee under vicarious liability rule. Our model also generalizes and extends vicarious liability to the negligence-based liability rule.

Promoting the Solar Industry in Ghana through Effective Public-Private Partnership (PPP): Some Lessons from South Africa and Morocco

Over the past decades, solar energy has gained much attention in Ghana, especially after the 2012–2016 power crisis. The government through Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) has attempted to increase the shares of solar generation to augment its efforts in reducing the energy deficit of the country, especially in remote and off-grid communities. However, the extent to which PPP has been utilized as a viable tool for solar sector development in Ghana is questionable. This study discusses the current state of PPPs in Ghana’s solar industry and compares how it has been efficiently used as a tool to promote the solar industry in South Africa and Morocco. Fundamental theories such as Altruism, Game, Principal-agent, and Pareto Optimality (PO) were used as analytical tools to examine how PPPs are handled in the selected cases. The study ascertains that the Game and PO are applicable theories that have guided SA and Morocco’s solar infrastructural development. This study discovered that PPP has been efficiently used in SA and Morocco to push its solar industry to be among the best in the world and Ghana can perfectly emulate it. The study further reveals that the Principal-agent analogy and altruistic intent of the Ghanaian government tend to discourage Private sector participation in the solar industry. It further suggests the Pareto Optimality, Game approach, and a win-win transparent attitude towards PPPs. This study recommends a well-developed PPP structure and law for Ghana. It encourages transparency and discourages partisan preferentialism to increase PPPs in Ghana’s solar industry.

8. Governing Through Bureaucracy

This chapter explores the central government departments, executive agencies, and other public bureaucracies in operation in the UK today, such as those in local and territorial governments. These bodies help make and implement public policies and run public services. The chapter reviews more general work on bureaucracy and public administration, and sets out the theory of politician–bureaucrat relationships (going back to the principal–agent model), before addressing the classic question of civil service influence over public policy. It then takes account of the diversity of bureaucratic organizations operating in Britain today. The chapter also looks at the evidence of how politicians manage to satisfy their political objectives through delegating authority to these bodies.

Using Principal–Steward Contracting and Scenario Planning to Manage Megaprojects

Performance on megaprojects is dismal. Megaprojects are complex, but people use constructs inappropriate in complex situations for their management, particularly contractual arrangements based on principal–agent governance and conventional project management, which is good at solving puzzles, but not at enlightening mysteries. I review current thinking. Principal–steward contracting is a liberal governance structure required in complex situations. Conventional project management emphasizes control at the expense of innovation. In cases of high uncertainty, innovation is required as unexpected events occur. Scenario planning is offered as a way of approaching the management of complex megaprojects, to construct narratives, and to identify alternative outcomes.

Female Director and Agency Cost: Does board gender diversity at Indian corporate board reduce agency conflict?

We examined the presence of women directors in top-level management and their effect on principal-principal conflict (PP) and principal-agent conflict (PA) on the firms listed on Indian stock exchange using a panel model approach. For analysis purpose, this study covers the sample of 75 companies belonging to various industries and listed in Bombay Stock Exchange Index, has been studied over thirteen financial years, i.e. from year 2006 to year 2019. This study uses panel data analysis, i.e. fixed effect model and random effect model. The proportion and presence (dichotomous) of women directors on top level management board is taken as the independent variable. Principal-principal conflict measured by assets utilization ratio (AUR), and principal-agent conflict is been measured by dividend payout ratio (DPR), are taken as dependent variable in this study. The prime results of this study using panel data analysis, i.e. fixed effect (FE) and random effects (RE) estimation models point towards no significant impact of the female director (proportion and presence) on the firm’s agency cost (PP and PA).