scholarly journals Property Tax Delinquency and Its Spillover Effects on Nearby Properties

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Alm ◽  
Zack Hawley ◽  
Jin Man Lee ◽  
Joshua J. Miller
2016 ◽  
Vol 58 ◽  
pp. 71-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Alm ◽  
Zackary Hawley ◽  
Jin Man Lee ◽  
Joshua J. Miller

2019 ◽  
Vol 72 (3) ◽  
pp. 479-506 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Chirico ◽  
Robert Inman ◽  
Charles Loeffler ◽  
John MacDonald ◽  
Holger Sieg

2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 105-127
Author(s):  
Julián Ramajo ◽  
Alejandro Ricci-Risquete ◽  
Lourdes Jerez ◽  
Geoffrey J. D. Hewings

This article explores the spatiotemporal pattern in the local tax system of Extremadura, a region in the southwest of Spain. Using the most relevant tax in terms of revenues at the local level in Spain, the property tax on urban land, a very general space–time dynamic panel data model with spatial and time period fixed effects, has been estimated to explore different types of strategic tax interactions among local governments. The empirical analysis uses a balanced panel database covering 383 municipalities from Extremadura for the period 2006–2015 to estimate the reaction of tax policy in a given municipality to its own past, to changes in tax policy in other municipalities, and to (direct and indirect) changes in some control variables. The results show that nominal local property tax rates are affected by tax policy inertia from the own municipality and neighboring municipalities and two observed municipal characteristics, whereas effective tax rates depend on tax policy inertia from the own municipality and property tax policies from neighboring municipalities and five observed municipal characteristics. In both cases, local spillover effects are not significant at standard statistical levels.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Camila Alvayay Torrejón ◽  
Dusan Paredes ◽  
Mark Skidmore

1988 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 553-559 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Conrad ◽  
Larry DeBoer

2016 ◽  
Vol 53 (5) ◽  
pp. 898-923 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deborah A. Carroll ◽  
Christopher B. Goodman

We examine the influence of property tax delinquency on the sale price of nearby homes from 2002 to 2013 using more than 46,000 residential property sales in a representative midwestern central city—Milwaukee, Wisconsin. After controlling for a number of property and neighborhood characteristics including nearby foreclosures, we find property tax delinquency has a significant influence on nearby home sales. The relationship is negative; one additional tax delinquent property within 250 m of a home sale is associated with a discounted sale price of 0.79% or approximately $1,085 on average. In addition, the influence of tax delinquent properties on home sale prices diminishes with distance, suggesting blight is the source of the discount. Based on these findings, the negative influence of tax delinquency is likely to be exacerbated in central cities where housing density is greater and delinquency is higher and more persistent than the surrounding suburbs, which has the potential to lead to fiscal distress as property taxes are the primary revenue source for cities. As such, we suggest a two-tiered approach for cities to mitigate the negative consequences of tax delinquency: a combination of policies to eliminate delinquency and also to help homeowners become financially stable.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 39-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniele Coen-Pirani ◽  
Michael Wooley

The Great Depression produced a profound and lasting influence on the structure of US government. This paper studies theoretically and empirically the increased centralization of revenues and expenditures by the states relative to local governments during this period. A model of property and sales taxation and tax delinquency is introduced. In the model, the income decline of the Depression causes a rise in property tax delinquency and leads to a shift toward sales taxation and fiscal centralization by the states. Empirical evidence based on cross-state variation in the severity of the Depression is consistent with the model's key predictions. (JEL E32, H25, H71, H72, H77, N12, N42)


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Chirico ◽  
Robert Inman ◽  
Charles Loeffler ◽  
John MacDonald ◽  
Holger Sieg

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea López-Luzuriaga ◽  
Carlos Scartascini,

An analytical model and a field experiment in Argentina proved that salient enforcement messages on one type of tax could increase compliance with another tax. Salient messages of penalties and enforcement for the property tax had positive spillover effects on declaration of the gross sales tax, with taxpayers in the treatment group increasing their reported tax by 2 percent. Taxpayers appear to assume that higher enforcement of one tax implies higher enforcement for others, thereby increasing their compliance across taxes.


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