Quantal Response Equilibria in a Generalized Volunteer's Dilemma and Step-Level Public Goods Games with Binary Decision

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toshiji Kawagoe ◽  
Taisuke Matsubae ◽  
Hirokazu Takizawa
2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (03) ◽  
pp. 1550004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Friedel Bolle

The launch of a public project requires "enough" support from a group of 'n' players, i.e., a certain threshold has to be passed. The players may be differently important for passing the threshold; they may have different costs of support and different benefits if the project is launched. If players have only binary decision sets (participate or not, vote approvingly or not) this game is called a Binary Threshold Public Goods game (BTPG). We compare the expected equilibrium payoffs in BTPGs with the same costs and benefits but different thresholds. Applying two principles of equilibrium selection, the least and the most demanding threshold, namely "one supporting player is sufficient" (Volunteer's Dilemma) and "support by all players is necessary" (Stag Hunt game) are payoff equivalent for all players. Compared with the Stag Hunt game, all intermediate thresholds are connected with Pareto-inferior payoffs.


Evolution ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 65 (10) ◽  
pp. 2725-2728 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nichola J. Raihani ◽  
Redouan Bshary

2021 ◽  
Vol 185 ◽  
pp. 513-537
Author(s):  
Adriana Alventosa ◽  
Alberto Antonioni ◽  
Penélope Hernández

2021 ◽  
Vol 144 ◽  
pp. 110720
Author(s):  
Maja Duh ◽  
Marko Gosak ◽  
Matjaž Perc

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (11) ◽  
pp. 1450062 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong-Bin Zhang ◽  
Hong Wang

We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on the square lattice, focusing on the co-player learning mechanism based on the preferential selection that are brought about by wealthy information of groups where participants collect and search for potential imitators from those groups. We find that co-player learning mechanism based on the choice of weighted group can lead to the promotion of public cooperation by means of the information of wealthy groups that is obtained by participants, and after that the partial choice of public goods groups is enhanced with the tunable preferential parameter. Our results highlight that the learning interactions is not solely confined to the restricted connection among players, but co-players of wealthy groups have the opportunity to be as a role model in the promotion of cooperative evolution. Moreover, we also find the size of learning affects the choice of distant players, cooperators (defectors) having more paths to exploit the phalanx of opponents to survive when the value of preferential parameter is small. Besides, the extinction thresholds of cooperators and defectors for different values of noise are also investigated.


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