Effective Enforcement of Sanctions for Market Abuse in the EU: Introduction of Criminal Sanctions

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Libor Klimek
Author(s):  
De Carvalho Robalo Pedro

This chapter assesses market abuse. Market abuse offences, in all of their possible forms, frustrate the concept of market efficiency by allowing undue advantage to the individuals performing the abusive actions, thus jeopardizing the development of fair and orderly markets. In turn, this is likely to harm confidence by undermining investors' beliefs that the market is fair, leading them to withdraw their investments. In Europe, the first European-wide legislative package was initiated with the adoption of the Market Abuse Directive in 2003 (Directive 2003/6/EC), with the aim of providing a broad framework that would address market manipulation and insider dealing practices in the EU. However, in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis in 2008, a review of the regime was required as a number of deficiencies were found. In 2011 and in order to address these issues, the European Commission adopted the proposal for the Regulation on insider dealing and market manipulation (MAR) as well as the Directive on Criminal Sanctions for Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (CSMAD).


2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-244
Author(s):  
Howard Chitimira

The European Union (EU) was arguably the first body to establish multinational anti-market abuse laws aimed at enhancing the detection and curbing of cross-border market abuse activities in its Member States. Put differently, the EU Insider Dealing Directive was adopted in 1989 and was the first law that harmonized the insider trading ban among the EU Member States. Thereafter, the European Union Directive on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (EU Market Abuse Directive) was adopted in a bid to improve and effectively discourage all forms of market abuse in the EU’s securities and financial markets. However, the EU Market Abuse Directive had its own gaps and flaws. In light of this, the Market Abuse Regulation and the Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse Directive were enacted to repeal and replace the EU Market Abuse Directive in 2016. The article examines the adequacy of the EU Market Abuse Directive and its implementation in the United Kingdom (UK) prior to the UK’s vote to leave the European Union (Brexit). This is done to investigate the possible implications of the Brexit referendum outcome of 23 June 2016 on the future regulation of market abuse in the UK.


2007 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 145
Author(s):  
Verena Murshetz

Recent developments regarding criminal matters within the European Union (EU) show a trend towards a supranational criminal competence, which could be realised before the entry into force of the European Constitution whose future is uncertain. The strongest indicators in this development are two judgments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), one that extends the powers of the European Community (EC) over the protection of the environment through criminal sanctions  and the other applying the principle of conforming interpretation to framework decisions . This trend is questionable though, as the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) does not confer a criminal competence upon the EC. The third pillar containing criminal matters is intergovernmental in nature. This article critically discusses the recent trend and presents arguments against an implied supranational criminal law within the EU.


CFA Magazine ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 51-52
Author(s):  
Mirzha de Manuel Aramendia
Keyword(s):  

2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-182
Author(s):  

COURT, MEET THY PUBLICThe public stir caused by recent rulings of the European Court of Justice opens a new window on the EU judiciary's condition and especially on its relations with the public. In the Pupino judgment, the Court ordered Italian colleagues to align domestic rules of criminal procedure with the EU ones by way of construction, whenever possible. The Environmental Framework decision ruling was about a legislative act meant to have states protect the environment by the use of criminal sanctions.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey P. Burgess ◽  
Timothy McIver ◽  
Philippe Tenglemann ◽  
Rosanne Lariven ◽  
Andrea Pomana ◽  
...  

Purpose To provide an overview of the national foreign direct investment (“FDI”) screening mechanisms in place across Europe including in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK. Design/methodology/approach This article summarizes the key elements of the national FDI screening regimes of some of the leading European economies. This includes setting out the relevant investment thresholds, protected sectors, lengths of review periods, standstill obligations and potential sanctions in each jurisdiction. Findings Many of Europe’s leading economies are following the wider global trend towards stricter reviews of foreign investment ahead of the EU Screening Regulation coming into force in October 2020. However, the approach taken to FDI screening can vary significantly at a country level in terms of both process and substance and the applicable laws are evolving rapidly, not least as a response to concerns related to the impact of COVID-19. Practical implications Investors looking to make acquisitions in Europe will need to consider whether national FDI screening will apply to their proposed investments. Depending on the jurisdiction, FDI screening can introduce lengthy review periods and require detailed information gathering as well as uncertainty as to the final outcome. Potential investors also need to consider the risk of sanctions, including criminal sanctions, for non-compliance with the screening regimes. Originality/value This article offers a summary and comparison of national FDI screening regimes across Europe.


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