Does Board Independence Substitute for External Audit Quality? Evidence from an Exogenous Regulatory Shock

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pandej Chintrakarn ◽  
Sirimon Treepongkaruna ◽  
Pornsit Jiraporn ◽  
Shenghui Tong
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
External Audit ◽  
Quality Evidence

Does board independence substitute for external audit quality? Evidence from an exogenous regulatory shock

2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pornsit Jiraporn ◽  
Pandej Chintrakarn ◽  
Shenghui Tong ◽  
Sirimon Treepongkaruna
Keyword(s):  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Causal Effect ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Difference In Difference ◽  
External Audit ◽  
Effective Governance ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Quality Evidence

Exploiting the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) as an exogenous regulatory shock, we investigate whether board independence substitutes for external audit quality. Based on over 14,000 observations across 18 years, our difference-in-difference estimates show that firms forced to raise board independence are far less likely to employ a Big 4 auditor. In particular, board independence lowers the propensity to use a Big 4 auditor by approximately 38%. Firms with stronger board independence enjoy more effective governance and therefore do not need as much external audit quality as those with less effective governance do. Based on a natural experiment, our empirical strategy is far less vulnerable to endogeneity and is thus considerably more likely to show a causal effect, rather than merely an association.

Earnings management and audit quality at Damascus securities exchange: Does managerial ownership matter?

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zukaa Mardnly ◽  
Zinab Badran ◽  
Sulaiman Mouselli
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
External Audit ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the individual and combined effect of managerial ownership and external audit quality, as two control mechanisms, on earnings management. Design/methodology/approach This study applies ordinary least squares estimates on fixed-time effects panel regression model to test the impact of the investigated variables on earnings management for the whole population of banks and insurance companies listed at Damascus Securities Exchange (DSE) during the period from 2011 to 2018. Findings The empirical evidence suggests a negative non-linear relationship between managerial ownership (as proxied by board of directors’ ownership) on earnings management. However, neither audit quality nor the simultaneous effect of the managerial ownership and audit quality (Big 4) affects earnings management. Research limitations/implications DSE is dominated by the financial sector and the number of observations is constrained by the recent establishment of DSE and the small number of firms listed at DSE. In addition, the non-availability of data on executive directors’ and foreign ownerships restrict our ability to uncover the impact of different dimensions of ownership structure on earnings management. Practical implications First, it stimulates investors to purchase stocks in financial firms that enjoy both high managerial ownership, as they seem enjoying higher earnings quality. Second, the findings encourage external auditors to consider the ownership structure when choosing their clients as the financial statements’ quality is affected by this structure. Third, researchers may need to consider the role of managerial ownership when analyzing the determinants of earnings management. Originality/value It fills the gap in the literature, as it investigates the impact of both managerial ownership and audit quality on earnings management in a special conflict context and in an unexplored emerging market of DSE. It suggests that managerial ownership exerts a significant role in controlling earnings management practices when loose regulatory environment combines conflict conditions. However, external audit quality fails to counter earnings management practices when conditions are fierce.

Non-audit services and audit quality: evidence from Germany

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (5) ◽  
pp. 959-1007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela Hohenfels ◽  
Reiner Quick
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Quality Evidence ◽  
Non Audit Services

scholarly journals Corporate Governance And Voluntary Disclosure In France

2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 561 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos P. Barros ◽  
Sabri Boubaker ◽  
Amal Hamrouni
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Board Meeting ◽  
External Audit ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Governance Practices

This paper investigates the effect of corporate governance practices on the extent of voluntary disclosure in France. Using a panel of 206 non-financial French listed firms during the period 20062009, we find evidence that voluntary disclosure in annual reports increases with managerial ownership, board and audit committee independence, board meeting frequency, and external audit quality. We also find that frequency of audit committee meetings and diligence of board and auditing are associated with decreased disclosure. Additional findings show that larger, more profitable, and less indebted firms have greater voluntary disclosure.

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