Determining the Level of Market Concentration in the Construction Sector—Case of Application of the HHI Index

Background—competitive conditions are often distorted in the construction sector, therefore this affects the market position of all participants. This paper seeks to find the tools for properly assessment of participants by Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (HHI) and to identify what parameters have the greatest impact in the competitiveness of the construction sector. Methods: in this article the DEMATEL method was used whereas tool for assessing the balance of market concentration as it may help to determine factor with the greatest influence on a firm’s HHI. Results in this work showed how different parameters affect each other and their impact on a value of a firms’s HHI. When the parameters are determined, they can be useful for assesment of mergers their influence on the HHI and alteration of the market’s power balance. Conclusions—The calculation of the HHI by using the DEMATEL method allowed to check the empirical implementation check of the multicriteria assessment method, on the market power of business entities, operating in the distorted market conditions of the construction sector.

Analisis Struktur Pasar Kentang Pada Pasar Relokasi di Plaju Palembang

Pasar Modern Plaju is a modern market, which was relocated from the traditional market Pasar Plaju so that there is a change in management of the market. Vegetables are the most widely sold commodity in the market, one of which is potatoes. Potatoes harvested area and production in South Sumatra had fluctuated in the past five years. Producer and consumer prices also fluctuated but have positive trends. Changes in market management and potato prices are always fluctuating, which would affect the market structure. The study aimed at determining the buying and selling activities and the structure of the potato market in Pasar Modern Plaju. The data came from 10 potato retailers. The data collected is daily data from buying and selling activities during January 2020 and was analyzed quantitatively. The analysis used was market concentration ratio (CR) and HHI (Herfindal-Hirschman Index). The result showed the diluent traders bought potatoes from a collector at a maximum of 600 kg per purchase, did not do grading, and the payment system was in cash. The market concentration ratio showed 59,18% CR4 and 93,27% CR8 was indicated that the structure of the potato market in Pasar Modern Plaju was oligopsony. HHI value 1.313 also showed that the potatoes market structure trend to word oligopsony market. These findings imply that the structure market can be influenced by the type of market.

Audience and Revenue Concentration in Lithuanian Media Markets (2008–2019)

The article examines the change in audience and revenue concentration in the Lithuanian television, radio, internet, and newspaper markets in 2008–2019, as well as discusses the factors that determined the changes in media concentration and market structure. The study revealed that without any special measures to regulate media concentration in Lithuania, all four media revenue markets (television, radio, internet, and newspapers) have become highly concentrated. In terms of audience (circulation) concentration, the concentration of newspaper and television markets was divided between un concentrated and moderately concentrated areas, the radio audience was moderately concentrated, and the audience of internet news websites was highly concentrated. The results of the analysis show a tendency for audience concentration in media markets to be generally lower than income market concentration. Therefore, when legally defining a dominant position in media markets, it is recommended to set a lower value for audience share than for revenue market share.

The Creator Economy: Managing Ecosystem Supply, Revenue Sharing, and Platform Design

Many digital platforms give users a bundle of goods sourced from numerous creators, generate revenue through consumption of these goods, and motivate creators by sharing of revenue. This paper studies the platform’s design choices and creators’ participation and supply decisions when users’ (viewers’) consumption of goods (content) is financed by third-party advertisers. The model specifies the platform’s scale: number of creators and content supplied and magnitudes of viewers, advertisers, and revenues. I examine how the distribution of creator capabilities affects market concentration among creators and how it can be influenced by platform design. Tools for ad management and analytics are more impactful when the platform has sufficient content and viewers but has low ad demand. Conversely, reducing viewers’ distaste for ads through better matching and timing—which can create win–win–win effects throughout the ecosystem—is important when the platform has strong demand from advertisers. Platform infrastructure improvements that motivate creators to supply more content (e.g., development toolkits) must be chosen carefully to avoid creating higher concentration among a few powerful creators. Investments in first-party content are most consequential when the platform scale is small and when it has greater urgency to attract more viewers. I show that revenue sharing is (only partly) a tug of war between the platform and creators because a moderate sharing formula strengthens the overall ecosystem and profits of all participants. However, revenue-sharing tensions indicate a need to extend the one-rate-for-all creators approach with richer revenue-sharing arrangements that can better accommodate heterogeneity among creators. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, information systems.