How Much Does the Choice between the Theories of Collusion and Unilateral Effects Matter in Merger Analysis?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malcolm B. Coate ◽  
Shawn W. Ulrick

Author(s):  
Bertram Neurohr

AbstractFarrell and Shapiro’s upward pricing pressure (‘UPP’) is widely used in merger analysis due to its intuitiveness, despite not accounting for the interdependence between the merging firms’ pricing incentives (‘feedback effects’). However, ignoring feedback effects can have an impact on the way competition authorities rank mergers. The main result of this article is that UPP with feedback effects is equivalent to Werden’s critical efficiencies. Importantly, this link allows for the derivation of an expression that combines the intuition of UPP as the ‘value of diverted sales’ with the accuracy of critical efficiencies. Throughout, the focus is on the static unilateral effects of horizontal mergers with differentiated Bertrand competition.







2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duarte Brito ◽  
Ricardo Ribeiro ◽  
Helder Vasconcelos


2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-177
Author(s):  
Nathan H. Miller ◽  
Gloria Sheu




2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 179-212
Author(s):  
Tommaso Valletti ◽  
Hans Zenger

AbstractOn the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the 2010 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, this article provides an overview of the state of economic analysis of unilateral effects in mergers with differentiated products. Drawing on our experience with merger enforcement in Europe, we discuss both static and dynamic competition, with a special emphasis on the calibration of competitive effects. We also discuss the role of market shares and structural presumptions in differentiated product markets.



Author(s):  
Joseph Farrell ◽  
Carl Shapiro

We reply here to a comment by Epstein and Rubinfeld to our paper on the antitrust evaluation of horizontal mergers.



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