Upward Pricing Pressure in Horizontal Merger Analysis: Reply to Epstein and Rubinfeld

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Farrell ◽  
Carl Shapiro
Keyword(s):  
Horizontal Merger ◽  
Horizontal Mergers ◽  
Merger Analysis

We reply here to a comment by Epstein and Rubinfeld to our paper on the antitrust evaluation of horizontal mergers.

Capacity Constraints and Horizontal Merger Effects

2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 444-454
Author(s):  
Jay Ezrielev
Keyword(s):  
Binding Capacity ◽  
Market Concentration ◽  
Capacity Constraints ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Horizontal Merger ◽  
Horizontal Mergers ◽  
Price Effects ◽  
Analytical Tools ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Merger Simulation

This article examines how capacity constraints affect horizontal mergers. Binding capacity constraints for merging firms may mitigate merger price effects, but capacity constraints for nonmerging firms may either amplify or mitigate such effects. The presence of capacity constraints for both the merging and nonmerging firms in a market further complicates the analysis of merger price effects. Capacity constraints may also confound the relationship between market concentration and merger price effects. In addition, capacity constraints affect market definition analysis and analytical tools such as merger simulation and upward pricing pressure indexes. Analyzing the effects of capacity constraints on mergers continues to be a challenge for merger reviews.

scholarly journals Horizontal mergers and weak and strong competition commissions

2014 ◽  
Vol 59 (202) ◽  
pp. 69-106
Author(s):  
Bojan Ristic ◽  
Dejan Trifunovic
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Detailed Examination ◽  
Horizontal Merger ◽  
Horizontal Mergers ◽  
Commission Decision ◽  
Competition Commission ◽  
Strong Competition ◽  
Regulatory Practice

In this paper we analyse the horizontal merger of companies in an already concentrated industry. The participants in mergers are obliged to submit notification to the Competition Commission but they also have the option of rejecting the merger. At the time of the notification submission the participants do not know whether the Commission is strong or weak, and they can complain to the Court if the Commission prohibits the merger. We model the strategic interaction between Participants and Commission in a dynamic game of incomplete information and determine weak perfect Bayesian equilibria. The main finding of our paper is that Participants will base their decision to submit notification on their belief in a weak Commission decision and will almost completely ignore the possibility of a strong Commission decision. We also provide a detailed examination of one case from Serbian regulatory practice, which coincides with the results of our game theoretical model.

CAN ENTRY OR EXIT EVENT STUDIES INFORM HORIZONTAL MERGER ANALYSIS? EVIDENCE FROM GROCERY RETAILING

2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 342-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel S. Hosken ◽  
Luke M. Olson ◽  
Loren K. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Event Studies ◽  
Horizontal Merger ◽  
Merger Analysis ◽  
Grocery Retailing

Vertical mergers and the vGUPPI: quantifying vertical foreclosure

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-50
Author(s):  
Ilaria Fanton ◽  
Spyros Droukopoulos ◽  
Matthew Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Quantitative Assessment ◽  
Horizontal Merger ◽  
Horizontal Mergers ◽  
Pressure Index ◽  
Economic Framework ◽  
The World ◽  
Vertical Mergers ◽  
Vertical Foreclosure

Competition authorities around the world have for many years used sophisticated quantitative tools to assess the likely scale of harm from horizontal mergers. More recently, vertical mergers have also been increasingly scrutinized by competition authorities using a range of quantitative tools. These tools help the authorities to quantify the incentive of the merging parties to enact vertical foreclosure strategies that would harm competition. One of those tools, known as the vGUPPI (vertical gross upward pricing pressure index), uses the same theoretical economic framework as the quantitative assessment used in horizontal merger assessments. This article explains how the vGUPPI tool works and uses two recent merger decisions of the Competition and Markets Authority in the groceries sector as case studies.

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