scholarly journals Ramsey Optimal Policy in the New-Keynesian Model with Public Debt

Author(s):  
Jean-Bernard Chatelain ◽  
Kirsten Ralf
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Jean-Bernard Chatelain ◽  
Kirsten Ralf

In the discrete-time new-Keynesian model with public debt, Ramsey optimal policy eliminates the indeterminacy of simple-rules multiple equilibria between the fiscal theory of the price level versus new-Keynesian versus an unpleasant equilibrium. If public debt volatility is taken into account into the loss function, the interest rate responds to public debt besides inflation and output gap. Else, the Taylor rule is identical to Ramsey optimal policy when there is zero public debt. The optimal fiscal-rule parameter implies the local stability of public-debt dynamics (“passive” fiscal policy).


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 142-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael U. Krause ◽  
Stéphane Moyen

What are the effects of a higher central bank inflation target on the burden of real public debt? Several recent proposals have suggested that even a moderate increase in the inflation target can have a pronounced effect on real public debt. We consider this question in a New Keynesian model with a maturity structure of public debt and an imperfectly observed inflation target. We find that moderate changes in the inflation target only have significant effects on real public debt if they are essentially permanent. Moreover, the additional benefits of not communicating a change in the inflation target are minor. (JEL E12, E31, E52, H63)


2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 53-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Eusepi ◽  
Bart Hobijn ◽  
Andrea Tambalotti

We construct a PCE-based price index whose weights minimize the welfare costs of nominal distortions: a cost-of-nominal-distortions index. We compute these weights in a multi-sector New Keynesian model, calibrated to match US data on price stickiness, labor shares, and inflation across sectors. The CONDI weights mostly depend on price stickiness. Moreover, CONDI stabilization leads to negligible welfare losses compared to the optimal policy and is better approximated by core rather than headline inflation targeting. An even better approximation can be obtained with an adjusted core index. (JEL C14, E12, E25, E31, E52).


2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 395-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raffaele Rossi

This paper studies the determinacy properties of monetary and fiscal policy rules in a small-scale New Keynesian model. We modify the standard model in two ways. First, we allow positive public debt in the steady state as in Leeper [Journal of Monetary Economics 27, 129–147 (1991)]. Second, we add rule-of-thumb consumers as in Bilbiie [Journal of Economic Theory 140, 162–196 (2008)]. Leeper studied a model in which Ricardian equivalence holds, and he showed that monetary and fiscal policy can be studied independently. In Bilbiie's analysis, rule-of-thumb consumers break the Ricardian equivalence and generate important consequences for the design of monetary policy. In his model, steady-state public debt was equal to zero. We study a model with both rule-of-thumb consumers and positive steady-state public debt. We find that the mix of fiscal and monetary policies that guarantees equilibrium determinacy is sensitive to the exact values of the parameters of the model.


2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 1895-1920 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hyosung Kwon ◽  
Jianjun Miao

This paper extends Woodford's approach to the robustly optimal monetary policy to a general linear quadratic framework. We provide algorithms to solve for a time-invariant linear robustly optimal policy in a timeless perspective and for a time-invariant linear Markov perfect equilibrium under discretion. We apply our methods to a New Keynesian model of monetary policy with persistent cost-push shocks and inflation persistence. We find that the robustly optimal commitment inflation is less responsive to a cost-push shock when the shock is more persistent and that the robustly optimal discretionary policy is more responsive to lagged inflation when inflation is more persistent.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document