SECTORAL LABOR MOBILITY AND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY

How should central banks optimally aggregate sectoral inflation rates in the presence of imperfect labor mobility across sectors? We study this issue in a two-sector New-Keynesian model and show that a lower degree of sectoral labor mobility, ceteris paribus, increases the optimal weight on inflation in a sector that would otherwise receive a lower weight. We analytically and numerically find that, with limited labor mobility, adjustment to asymmetric shocks cannot fully occur through the reallocation of labor, thus putting more pressure on wages, causing inefficient movements in relative prices, and creating scope for central bank’ s intervention. These findings challenge standard central banks’ practice of computing sectoral inflation weights based solely on sector size and unveil a significant role for the degree of sectoral labor mobility to play in the optimal computation. In an extended estimated model of the US economy, featuring customary frictions and shocks, the estimated inflation weights imply a decrease in welfare up to 10% relative to the case of optimal weights.

Strategic deviations in optimal monetary policy

This paper investigates the circumstances under which a central bank is more or less likely to deviate from the optimal monetary policy rule. The research question is addressed in a simple New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in which monetary policy deviations occur endogenously. The model solution suggests that higher future central bank credibility attenuates the current period policy trade-off between a stable inflation rate and a stable output gap. Together with the loss of credibility after a policy deviation, this provides the central bank with an incentive to implement past policy commitments. The result is valid even if the central bank may recover credibility with some probability after a policy deviation. My main finding is that the central bank is willing to implement past policy commitments if a sufficient fraction of agents is not aware of the exact end date of the policy commitment. The result challenges the time-inconsistency argument against monetary policy commitments and provides a potential explanation for the repeated implementation of monetary policy commitments in reality.