The Effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure on the Relevance of Conference Calls to Financial Analysts

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Afshad J. Irani
Keyword(s):  
Financial Analysts ◽  
Regulation Fair Disclosure ◽  
Conference Calls ◽  
Fair Disclosure

The Effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure on the Relevance of Conference Calls to Financial Analysts

CFA Digest ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 3-5
Author(s):  
Chenchuramaiah T. Bathala
Keyword(s):  
Financial Analysts ◽  
Regulation Fair Disclosure ◽  
Conference Calls ◽  
Fair Disclosure

The Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure: Trading Costs and Information Asymmetry

CFA Digest ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 9-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Trent
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Trading Costs ◽  
Regulation Fair Disclosure ◽  
Fair Disclosure ◽  
The Impact

The Influence of Regulation Fair Disclosure on Firm Financing Decisions

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan M. Albring ◽  
Monica L. Banyi ◽  
Dan S. Dhaliwal ◽  
Raynolde Pereira
Keyword(s):  
Regulation Fair Disclosure ◽  
Financing Decisions ◽  
Fair Disclosure ◽  
Firm Financing

Regulation Fair Disclosure and Credit Market

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yutao Li ◽  
Anthony Saunders ◽  
Pei Shao
Keyword(s):  
Credit Market ◽  
Regulation Fair Disclosure ◽  
Fair Disclosure

The Efficacy of Regulation Fair Disclosure

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Gadarowski ◽  
Praveen Sinha
Keyword(s):  
Regulation Fair Disclosure ◽  
Fair Disclosure

Concurrent Earnings Announcements and Analysts' Information Production

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Driskill ◽  
Marcus P. Kirk ◽  
Jennifer Wu Tucker
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Announcements ◽  
Financial Analysts ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Limited Attention ◽  
Conference Calls ◽  
Stock Recommendations ◽  
Rich Information ◽  
Sample Firm ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We examine whether financial analysts are subject to limited attention. We find that when analysts have another firm in their coverage portfolio announcing earnings on the same day as the sample firm (a “concurrent announcement”), they are less likely to issue timely earnings forecasts for the sample firm's subsequent quarter than analysts without a concurrent announcement. Among the analysts who issue timely earnings forecasts, the thoroughness of their work decreases as their number of concurrent announcements increases. In addition, analysts are more sluggish in providing stock recommendations and less likely to ask questions in earnings conference calls as their number of concurrent announcements increases. Moreover, when analysts face concurrent announcements, they tend to allocate their limited attention to firms that already have rich information environments, leaving behind firms in need of attention. Overall, our evidence suggests that even financial analysts, who serve as information specialists, are subject to limited attention. JEL Classifications: G10; G11; G17; G14. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

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