Disclosure Frequency, Information Environment, and Cost of Capital under Regulation Fair Disclosure in the Korean Market

Disclosure policy contributes to improve sustainable corporate information environment by mitigating information asymmetry surrounding companies. Economic theories generally support that more disclosures reduce the level of information asymmetry, increase stock liquidity, and thus decrease the costs of equity capital. However, the effect of corporate disclosure in emerging markets is not clearly predictable because of the potential information leakage prior to disclosure. Considering this issue, this study focuses on the Regulation Fair Disclosure which prohibits selective disclosure. Using the earnings-to-price ratio as a proxy of the costs of equity, the study finds that disclosure frequency is negatively related to the cost of equity capital. However, I do not find evidence that disclosure is negatively related to the implied costs of equity capital (ICOE). The results of the quintile analysis suggest that this inconsistency is attributable to the better information environment of the ICOE sample. The findings of this study have implications for disclosure regulations in emerging markets, given that the existing literature casts doubt on the effectiveness of corporate disclosure in such markets.

The Differential Informativeness of Positive and Negative Stock Returns

We show negative stock returns reverse more and contain less information on the long-term changes in share prices than positive stock returns mostly on nondisclosure days, and these information differences between negative and positive returns decrease substantially on disclosure days. The results suggest investors are more likely to acquire positive information on nondisclosure days and to obtain both negative and positive information on disclosure days. Accounting conservatism and litigation exposure compels managers to reveal their negative information in disclosures, and if managers withhold negative information, they do it when investors are less likely to find the information on nondisclosure days. Moreover, we use the exogenous imposition of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD) to demonstrate that positive information leakage from firms during the quarter is driving the positive slant in investors’ information. Taken together, our results suggest that disclosure plays an important role in the differential informativeness and reversals of positive and negative returns.

Do Innovative Firms Communicate More? Evidence from the Relation between Patenting and Management Guidance

Successful innovations could induce more disclosure if the information asymmetry between the firm and its investors about post-innovation outcomes leads investors to demand more information. However, such innovations also likely entail greater proprietary cost concerns, which deter disclosure. This paper uses patent grants to examine the effect of innovation success on management guidance behavior. We find that more management guidance follows patent grants, suggesting that despite disclosure cost concerns, firms with successful innovations do respond to information demand. This association is stronger after enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure and for firms with greater institutional investor ownership, further highlighting the role of information demand. The association is weaker for firms with more competition, consistent with proprietary cost concerns having a moderating impact. Overall, our findings suggest that innovation creates demand for more voluntary disclosure and firms' disclosure decisions following innovation outcomes vary in ways that disclosure theory and economic intuition predict.