A Note on 'Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The 'Boston Mechanism' Reconsidered'

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Zhang
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Boston Mechanism

Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The 'Boston' Mechanism Reconsidered

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atila Abdulkadiroglu ◽  
Yeon-Koo Che ◽  
Yosuke Yasuda
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Boston Mechanism

Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The “Boston Mechanism” Reconsidered

2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (1) ◽  
pp. 399-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atila Abdulkadiroğlu ◽  
Yeon-Koo Che ◽  
Yosuke Yasuda
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Ordinal Preferences ◽  
Boston Mechanism ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Deferred Acceptance Algorithm ◽  
Deferred Acceptance ◽  
Good Schools

Despite its widespread use, the Boston mechanism has been criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performances compared to the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm (DA). By contrast, when students have the same ordinal preferences and schools have no priorities, we find that the Boston mechanism Pareto dominates the DA in ex ante welfare, that it may not harm but rather benefit participants who may not strategize well, and that, in the presence of school priorities, the Boston mechanism also tends to facilitate greater access than the DA to good schools for those lacking priorities at those schools. (JEL D82, I21, I28)

scholarly journals School Choice Design, Risk Aversion, and Cardinal Segregation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caterina Calsamiglia ◽  
Francisco Martínez-Mora ◽  
Antonio Miralles
Keyword(s):  
Public Schools ◽  
School Choice ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Choice Procedure ◽  
Ordinal Preferences ◽  
Boston Mechanism ◽  
Public School Choice ◽  
Higher Types ◽  
Deferred Acceptance

Abstract We embed the problem of public school choice design in a model of local provision of education. We define cardinal (student) segregation as that emerging when families with identical ordinal preferences submit different rankings of schools in a centralised school choice procedure. With the Boston Mechanism (BM), when higher types are less risk-averse, and there is sufficient vertical differentiation of schools, any equilibrium presents cardinal segregation. Transportation costs facilitate the emergence of cardinal segregation as does competition from private schools. Furthermore, the latter renders the best public schools more elitist. The Deferred Acceptance mechanism is resilient to cardinal segregation.

Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism

2006 ◽  
Vol 90 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 215-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haluk Ergin ◽  
Tayfun Sönmez
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Boston Mechanism

scholarly journals Priorities in school choice: The case of the Boston mechanism in Barcelona

2018 ◽  
Vol 163 ◽  
pp. 20-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caterina Calsamiglia ◽  
Maia Güell
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Boston Mechanism

Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures

2007 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 357-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fuhito Kojima
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Boston Mechanism

Paige Issues Statement on D.C. School Choice Legislation

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
School Choice

School Choice for Student Success

2013 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
School Choice ◽  
Student Success
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