A Look Back: Taking stock of public school choice in Kappan

In this monthly column, Kappan managing editor Teresa Preston explores how the magazine has covered the questions and controversies about school choice. Although many authors across the decades objected to the use of vouchers to pay private school tuition, those same authors lent support to the idea of choice among public schools. Advocates of public school choice have endorsed various models for providing choices, from alternative schools, to magnet schools, to charter schools.

Segregated Neighborhoods, Segregated Schools: Do Charters Break a Stubborn Link?

Residential and school segregation have historically mirrored each other, with school segregation seen as simply reflecting residential patterns given neighborhood-based school assignment policy. We argue that the relationship is circular, such that school options also influence residential outcomes. We hypothesize that the expansion of charter schools could simultaneously lead to an increase in school segregation and a decrease in residential segregation. We examine what happens when neighborhood and school options are decoupled via public school choice in the form of charter schools using data from the census and the Common Core of Data on a national sample of more than 1,500 metropolitan districts. We find that Black-White school segregation increased and residential segregation declined in response to increases in the charter enrollment share from 2000 to 2010. In districts with charter schools, the average increase in the charter enrollment share corresponded to a 12% increase in school segregation and 2% decline in residential segregation. We find no relationship between charter school expansion and school segregation between White and Hispanic students, perhaps because Hispanic students attend more racially diverse charters than White or Black students. White-Hispanic residential segregation declined as charter enrollment increased. Our results demonstrate that educational policy is consequential for both school and neighborhood population processes. When these two contexts are decoupled via public school choice, school and neighborhood segregation patterns move in opposite directions, rather than mirroring each other. Our findings also provide a cautionary lesson for unfettered expansion of choice without integration imperatives.

The Distributional Consequences of Public School Choice

School choice systems aspire to delink residential location and school assignments by allowing children to apply to schools outside of their neighborhood. However, choice programs also affect incentives to live in certain neighborhoods, and this feedback may undermine the goals of choice. We investigate this possibility by developing a model of public school and residential choice. School choice narrows the range between the highest and lowest quality schools compared to neighborhood assignment rules, and these changes in school quality are capitalized into equilibrium housing prices. This compressed distribution generates an ends-against-the-middle trade-off with school choice compared to neighborhood assignment. Paradoxically, even when choice results in improvement in the lowest-performing schools, the lowest type residents need not benefit. (JEL H75, I21, I28, R23, R31)

School Choice Design, Risk Aversion, and Cardinal Segregation

We embed the problem of public school choice design in a model of local provision of education. We define cardinal (student) segregation as that emerging when families with identical ordinal preferences submit different rankings of schools in a centralised school choice procedure. With the Boston Mechanism (BM), when higher types are less risk-averse, and there is sufficient vertical differentiation of schools, any equilibrium presents cardinal segregation. Transportation costs facilitate the emergence of cardinal segregation as does competition from private schools. Furthermore, the latter renders the best public schools more elitist. The Deferred Acceptance mechanism is resilient to cardinal segregation.

Education Policy Trump Style: The Administrative Presidency and Deference to States in ESSA Implementation

Since the 1960s, U.S. presidents have used their executive, administrative, and political power to pursue policy goals in elementary and secondary education. This article analyzes the K-12 education policy strategies pursued during the first three years of the Donald Trump presidency, focusing on two main aspects of Trump’s approach to education policy. First, I analyze Trump’s heavy reliance on executive and administrative tools and his use of these tools to promote state flexibility, diminish federal direction on civil rights issues, and expand private and public school choice. Second, I examine the Trump administration’s approach to implementing the Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015 (ESSA), especially in reviewing state plans pursuant to the ESSA. The administration took a highly deferential approach as states sought approval for their ESSA plans and in a way that suggests the Trump presidency is shifting federal involvement in K-12 education policy away from prioritizing equity and oversight.

Peer Preferences, School Competition, and the Effects of Public School Choice

This paper develops a new economic model of public school choice. The key innovation is to model competition between schools in an environment in which parents have peer preferences. The analysis yields three main findings. First, peer preferences dampen schools’ incentives to exert effort in response to competitive pressure. Second, when peer preferences are sufficiently strong, choice can reduce social welfare. This is because choice is costly to exercise but aggregate peer quality is fixed. Third, given strong peer preferences, choice can reduce school quality in more affluent neighborhoods. We conclude that peer preferences weaken the case for choice. (JEL H73, H75, I21, I28, R23)

Parental Accountability, School Choice, and the Invisible Hand of the Market

I introduce the concept of parental accountability by examining how parents understand and cope with what I characterize are pressures fostered by the long-standing public-school choice market in Arizona. Parental accountability refers to the sensemaking, experiences, and consequences that are related to decision-making in a school choice environment, wherein parents’ feelings about their child’s schooling may be intense, emotionally stressful, malleable, cyclical, and ongoing—not static. I argue that parental accountability is a necessary concept for understanding these reforms. The analysis, based on data collected from a study using ethnographic methods, reveals contradictions between parents’ perceptions of their responsibilities to public institutions and pressures to make private choices. Many parents acknowledged that socioeconomic and racial inequities may be exacerbated in some market-based, public-school choice systems. I show how school choice policies and programs can place unique pressure on parents that they experience as a distinct form of accountability.

(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice

In public school choice, students with strict preferences are assigned to schools. Schools are endowed with priorities over students. Incorporating constraints from different applications, priorities are often modelled as choice functions over sets of students. It has been argued that the most desirable criterion for an assignment is stability; there should not exist any blocking pair: no student shall prefer some school to her assigned school and have higher priority than some student who got into that school or the school has an empty seat. We propose a blocking notion where in addition it must be possible to assign the student to her preferred school. We then define the following stability criterion for a set of assignments: a set of assignments is legal if and only if any assignment outside the set is blocked with some assignment in the set and no two assignments inside the set block each other. We show that under very basic conditions on priorities, there always exists a unique legal set of assignments, and that this set has a structure common to the set of stable assignments: (i) it is a lattice and (ii) it satisfies the rural hospitals theorem. The student-optimal legal assignment is efficient and provides a solution for the conflict between stability and efficiency.