The Rise of State-Owned Investors: Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Pension Funds

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
William L. Megginson ◽  
Diego López ◽  
Asif Malik
Keyword(s):  
Pension Funds ◽  
Public Pension ◽  
Sovereign Wealth Funds

The Rise of State-Owned Investors: Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Pension Funds

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
William L. Megginson ◽  
Diego Lopez ◽  
Asif I. Malik
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Private Equity ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
Pension Funds ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Public Pension ◽  
Annual Review ◽  
Publication Date ◽  
New Governance ◽  
Sovereign Wealth Funds

State-owned investors (SOIs), including sovereign wealth funds and public pension funds, have $27 trillion in assets under management in 2020, making these funds the third largest group of asset owners globally. SOIs have become the largest and are among the most important private equity investors, and they are key investors in other alternative asset investments such as real estate, infrastructure, and hedge funds. SOIs are also leaders in promoting environmental, social, and governance policies and corporate social responsibility policies in investee companies. We document the rise of SOIs, assess their current investment policies, and describe how their state ownership both constrains and enhances their investment opportunity sets. We survey the most impactful recent academic research on sovereign wealth funds, public pension funds, and their closest financial analogs, private pension funds. We also introduce a new Governance-Sustainability-Resilience Scoreboard for SOIs and survey research examining their role in promoting good corporate governance. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Financial Economics, Volume 13 is November 2021. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.

scholarly journals Who Values Corporate Social Responsibility in the Korean Stock Market?

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (21) ◽  
pp. 5924 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sangki Lee ◽  
Insu Kim ◽  
Chung-hun Hong
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Stock Market ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Private Sector ◽  
Abnormal Returns ◽  
Pension Funds ◽  
Public Pension ◽  
Korean Stock Market ◽  
The Government ◽  
Corporate Social

In this study, we explore the stock market’s response to new information that a firm has been included in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) in Korea. In addition, we investigate which investor group contributes to the changes, if any significant increase in returns is found, after a firm’s incorporation into the DJSI. This study aims to identify which investors value corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the Korean stock market and examine whether the government-led campaigns for CSR have affected private sector investors, as well as those from the public sector. We find statistically significant abnormal returns for firms after their first listing in the index, implying that investors in Korean markets consider a firm’s inclusion in the DJSI as good news for the firm value. Using a unique dataset from the Korea Exchange (KRX) on investors, we classify investors into four groups: individual investors, public pension funds, other institutional investors, and foreign investors. Unlike prior studies that focus only on the existence of abnormal returns, we investigate the trading behavior of each investor group for such announcements. We find that it is mainly the buying pressure of public pension funds that generates abnormal returns. By contrast, we cannot find statistically significant results for the other investor groups. This result implies that the government-led campaign for CSR has only had limited effects in the Korean stock market, and that awareness of CSR in the private sector should be improved.

Political Representation and Governance: Evidence from the Investment Decisions of Public Pension Funds

2018 ◽  
Vol 73 (5) ◽  
pp. 2041-2086 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEKSANDAR ANDONOV ◽  
YAEL V. HOCHBERG ◽  
JOSHUA D. RAUH
Keyword(s):  
Political Representation ◽  
Investment Decisions ◽  
Pension Funds ◽  
Public Pension

Portfolio allocation for public pension funds

2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
GEORGE PENNACCHI ◽  
MAHDI RASTAD
Keyword(s):  
Pension Fund ◽  
Pension Funds ◽  
Pension Plans ◽  
Public Pension ◽  
Annual Data ◽  
Portfolio Risk ◽  
Fund Management ◽  
Pension Fund Management ◽  
Portfolio Allocations ◽  
State Pension

AbstractThis paper presents a model of a public pension fund's choice of portfolio risk. Optimal portfolio allocations are derived when pension fund management maximize the utility of wealth of a representative taxpayer or when pension fund management maximize their own utility of compensation. The model's implications are examined using annual data on the portfolio allocations and plan characteristics of 125 state pension funds over the 2000–2009 period. Consistent with agency behavior by public pension fund management, we find evidence that funds chose greater overall asset – liability portfolio risk following periods of relatively poor investment performance. In addition, pension plans that select a relatively high rate with which to discount their liabilities tend to choose riskier portfolios. Moreover, consistent with a desire to gamble for higher benefits, pension plans take more risk when they have greater representation by plan participants on their Boards of Trustees.

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