Do Criminal Acts Affect Basic Moral Equality? (With Thoughts in Response to Shelly Kagan, Uwe Steinhoff and Christian List)

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
John A. Humbach
Keyword(s):  
Moral Equality

The Anti-Inflammatory Basis of Equality

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grant J. Rozeboom
Keyword(s):  
Social Practice ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Moral Equality ◽  
Anti Inflammatory ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Do So

We are moral equals, but in virtue of what? The most plausible answers to this question have pointed to our higher agential capacities, but we vary in the degrees to which we possess those capacities. How could they ground our equal moral standing, then? This chapter argues that they do so only indirectly. Our moral equality is most directly grounded in a social practice of equality, a practice that serves the purpose of mitigating our tendencies toward control and domination that interpreters of Rousseau call “inflamed amour-propre.” We qualify as participants in this practice of equality by possessing certain agential capacities, but it is our participation in the practice, and not the capacities themselves, that makes us moral equals. Thus, in contrast with recent accounts that simply posit a threshold above which capacity-variations are ignored, this chapter proposes moving from a capacity-based to a practice-based view of moral equality.

Deliberation and Equality

2018 ◽  
pp. 143-155
Author(s):  
Edana Beauvais
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Moral Equality ◽  
Close Relationship ◽  
Democratic Systems ◽  
The Relationship

Political systems are democratic to the extent that people are empowered to participate in political practices—such as voting, representing, deliberating, and resisting—that contribute to self-and collective-rule. There is a close relationship between equality and democracy, as equality distributes symmetrical empowerments that enable people affected by collective endeavors to participate in political practices that contribute to self- and collective-rule. This chapter elucidates the relationship between equality, inclusion, and deliberative practices in democratic systems. It describes two distinguishable values of equality required for distributing empowerments that enable deliberation: the value of universal moral equality, and the value of equity. The chapter then outlines different institutional arrangements that promote the values of universal moral equality and equity in deliberative practices.

A Buck-Passing Account of ‘Moral Equality’

Res Publica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elaine Lok-Lam Yim
Keyword(s):  
Moral Equality ◽  
Buck Passing

5. The Truth Within: Moral Equality

2014 ◽  
pp. 67-78
Keyword(s):  
Moral Equality

On the Moral Equality of Artificial Agents

2012 ◽  
pp. 70-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Wareham
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Empirical Test ◽  
Moral Worth ◽  
Artificial Agents ◽  
Moral Equality ◽  
Ethical Criteria ◽  
High Degree

Artificial agents such as robots are performing increasingly significant ethical roles in society. As a result, there is a growing literature regarding their moral status with many suggesting it is justified to regard manufactured entities as having intrinsic moral worth. However, the question of whether artificial agents could have the high degree of moral status that is attributed to human persons has largely been neglected. To address this question, the author developed a respect-based account of the ethical criteria for the moral status of persons. From this account, the paper employs an empirical test that must be passed in order for artificial agents to be considered alongside persons as having the corresponding rights and duties.

Moral Equality and ‘Natural’ Subordination

Moral Animals ◽  
2004 ◽  
pp. 254-301
Author(s):  
Catherine Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Equality

Contractarianism and the Moral Equality of Combatants

2019 ◽  
pp. 116-132
Author(s):  
Yitzhak Benbaji ◽  
Daniel Statman
Keyword(s):  
Jus In Bello ◽  
Moral Equality ◽  
Legal Standing ◽  
Moral Equality Of Combatants

The purpose of this chapter is to offer a contractarian defence of Moral Equality, the thesis that Just and Unjust Combatants do not wrong each other when they kill and maim each other in war. We concede that the killings of Just Combatants by Unjust Combatants is pre-contractually impermissible. Moral Equality is nevertheless true if an agreement between states that equalize the legal standing of soldiers is fair and also mutually beneficial. By accepting such an agreement, combatants attain a right to take advantage of traditional jus in bello rules, thereby violating no duty against Just Combatants by attacking them.

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