Are enhanced index funds enhanced?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edwin J. Elton ◽  
Martin J. Gruber ◽  
Andre de Souza
Keyword(s):  

1998 ◽  
Vol 1998 (6) ◽  
pp. 111-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R.C. Woodlock
Keyword(s):  


CFA Digest ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 65-66
Author(s):  
Keith H. Black


1978 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 34-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne H. Wagner ◽  
Carol A. Zipkin
Keyword(s):  


2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey L. Callen ◽  
Xinghua Liang
Keyword(s):  


Author(s):  
Bishwajit Rout ◽  
Sangeeta Mohanty

Indian mutual fund industry started with traditional products like equity fund, debt fund and balanced fund and later significantly increased it’s product base. Today, the industry has introduced a wide range of products such as money market funds, sector specific funds, index funds, gilt funds, insurance linked funds, exchange traded funds, and marching towards reality funds. The different types of schemes offered by the Indian mutual fund industry provide several options of investment to common man. What is noteworthy is that bulk of the mobilization has been by the private sector mutual funds rather than bank sponsored mutual funds. Through this paper the author has attempted to focus on the the factors that motivate the investors to invest in mutual funds.



1999 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
NICHOLAS G. POLSON ◽  
JEFFREY YASUMOTO
Keyword(s):  


2011 ◽  
pp. 110730015725008
Author(s):  
Keith Redhead ◽  
Jacek Niklewski


2014 ◽  
pp. 109-129
Author(s):  
Michael C. Thomsett
Keyword(s):  


2019 ◽  
pp. 90-126
Author(s):  
William Lazonick ◽  
Jang-Sup Shin

This chapter explains historical and systemic sources of institutional activism. Starting from re-examining underlying principles of New Deal financial regulations established in the 1930s that discouraged institutional activism, it argues that they were overturned in the 1980s and 1990s in the name of promoting “shareholder democracy.” It analyzes these misguided regulatory “reforms” including the introduction of compulsory voting by institutional investors, a proxy-voting rule change that greatly facilitated aggregation of proxy votes by predatory value extractors. The chapter argues that those reforms created a large vacuum in corporate voting because, contrary to the ideal of shareholder democracy and particularly with the increasing dominance of index funds, institutional investors had little ability and incentive to vote the shares in their portfolios. The main beneficiaries of these reforms have been the leading proxy advisory firms and a small group of hedge-fund activists intent on looting the business corporation.



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