Opportunism in the Shareholder Voting of the ‘Big Three’ Investment Advisers to Index Funds

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard S. Sharfman
Keyword(s):  
Shareholder Voting ◽  
Index Funds ◽  
Investment Advisers

Uses of Futures and Index Funds

1998 ◽  
Vol 1998 (6) ◽  
pp. 111-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R.C. Woodlock
Keyword(s):  
Index Funds

The Evolution of Shareholder Voting for Executive Compensation Schemes

CFA Digest ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 20-22
Author(s):  
Lorne Jeremy Zeiler
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Shareholder Voting

Index Funds and Stock Market Growth

CFA Digest ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 65-66
Author(s):  
Keith H. Black
Keyword(s):  
Stock Market ◽  
Index Funds ◽  
Market Growth

Can Inventory Index Funds Improve Active Equity Performance?

1978 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 34-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne H. Wagner ◽  
Carol A. Zipkin
Keyword(s):  
Index Funds

Let’s Make Investment Advisers Accountable!

1973 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-22
Author(s):  
Harry L. Nelson
Keyword(s):  
Investment Advisers

Disclosure and Search Costs: The Case of Retail S&P 500 Index Funds

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey L. Callen ◽  
Xinghua Liang
Keyword(s):  
Search Costs ◽  
Index Funds

Phantom of the Opera: Etfs and Shareholder Voting

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard B. Evans ◽  
Oğuzhan Karakaş ◽  
Rabih Moussawi ◽  
Michael Young
Keyword(s):  
Shareholder Voting

The Scope of the SEC's Authority Over Shareholder Voting Rights

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Bainbridge
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rights ◽  
Shareholder Voting

Fiduciary Principles in Investment Advice

2019 ◽  
pp. 144-165
Author(s):  
Arthur B. Laby
Keyword(s):  
Fiduciary Duty ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Complex Nature ◽  
State Law ◽  
Fiduciary Duties ◽  
Legal Obligations ◽  
Standards Of Conduct ◽  
Investment Advisers ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Investment Advice

This chapter examines the fiduciary principles governing investment advice. Fiduciary principles in investment advice are both straightforward and complex. They are straightforward because most investment advisers are considered fiduciaries and subject to strict fiduciary duties under federal and state law. Their complex nature arises from the fact that many individuals and firms provide investment advice but are not deemed investment advisers and, therefore, are not subject to a fiduciary obligation. This chapter first explains whether and when an advisory relationship gives rise to fiduciary duties by focusing on both federal and state law, as well as the individuals and firms that typically provide investment advice. In particular, it looks at certain persons and entities excluded from the definition of investment adviser and thus not subject to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, namely broker-dealers, banks, and family offices as well as accountants, lawyers, teachers, and engineers. The chapter also considers fiduciaries under ERISA, the Investment Company Act, and the Commodity Exchange Act before discussing the fiduciary duty of loyalty and how it is expressed and applied in investment advisory relationships; the fiduciary duty of care and how it differs from other standards of conduct, such as a duty of suitability; and other legal obligations imposed on investment advisers and how those obligations relate to an adviser’s fiduciary duty. Finally, the mandatory or default terms with regard to an investment adviser’s fiduciary duties are explored, along with remedies available for breach of fiduciary duty.

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