Collateral And The Debt Maturity Choice Under Asymmetric Information: A Signaling Model

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Lensink ◽  
Tra Pham
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Debt Maturity ◽  
Signaling Model

scholarly journals Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen N. Berger ◽  
Marco A. Espinosa ◽  
W. Scott Frame ◽  
Nathan H. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Debt Maturity

scholarly journals Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information

2004 ◽  
Vol 2004 (60) ◽  
pp. 1-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen N. Berger ◽  
◽  
Marco A. Espinosa-Vega ◽  
W. Scott Frame ◽  
Nathan H. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Debt Maturity

scholarly journals Does managerial discretion affect debt maturity in Chilean firms? An agency cost and asymmetric information approach

2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (43) ◽  
pp. 65-87
Author(s):  
Jorge Andrés Muñoz Mendoza ◽  
◽  
Sandra María Sepúlveda Yelpo ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Managerial Discretion ◽  
Debt Maturity ◽  
Information Approach

Debt Maturity and Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Default Risk Changes

2013 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 789-817 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vidhan K. Goyal ◽  
Wei Wang
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Default Risk ◽  
Important Determinant ◽  
Debt Maturity ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Information Models ◽  
Asset Volatility ◽  
Distance To Default

AbstractAsymmetric information models suggest that a borrower’s choice of debt maturity depends on its private information about its default probabilities, that is, borrowers with favorable information prefer short-term debt while those with unfavorable information prefer long-term debt. We test this implication by tracing the evolution of debt issuers’ default risk following debt issuances. We find that short-term debt issuance leads to a decline inborrowers’ asset volatility and an increase in their distance to default. The opposite is true for long-term debt issues. The results suggest that borrowers’ private information about their default risk is an important determinant of their debt maturity choices.

scholarly journals Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information

2005 ◽  
Vol 60 (6) ◽  
pp. 2895-2923 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALLEN N. BERGER ◽  
MARCO A. ESPINOSA-VEGA ◽  
W. SCOTT FRAME ◽  
NATHAN H. MILLER
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Debt Maturity

scholarly journals Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco A. Espinosa-Vega ◽  
Allen N. Berger ◽  
W. Scott Frame ◽  
Nathan H. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Debt Maturity
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