scholarly journals A Computationally Efficient Characterization of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Entry Games

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Milman Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Computationally Efficient ◽  
Large Entry ◽  
Entry Games

scholarly journals Representing pure Nash equilibria in argumentation

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Bruno Yun ◽  
Srdjan Vesic ◽  
Nir Oren
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Normal Form Games

In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil’s Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, showprove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.

scholarly journals Dinamicke igre ulaska na trziste

2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (165) ◽  
pp. 121-144
Author(s):  
Bozo Stojanovic
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Concept ◽  
Reasonable Solution ◽  
Multiple Nash Equilibria ◽  
Entry Games

Market processes can be analyzed by means of dynamic games. In a number of dynamic games multiple Nash equilibria appear. These equilibria often involve no credible threats the implementation of which is not in the interests of the players making them. The concept of sub game perfect equilibrium rules out these situations by stating that a reasonable solution to a game cannot involve players believing and acting upon noncredible threats or promises. A simple way of finding the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of a dynamic game is by using the principle of backward induction. To explain how this equilibrium concept is applied, we analyze the dynamic entry games.

The Limit Distribution of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Bimatrix Games

1996 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 726-733 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Stanford
Keyword(s):  
Limit Distribution ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Bimatrix Games

EFFICIENCY WAGES WITH HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (03) ◽  
pp. 1450007
Author(s):  
BRANDON LEHR
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Heterogeneous Agents ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Efficiency Wages

This paper builds a model of efficiency wages with heterogeneous workers in the economy who differ with respect to their disutility of labor effort. In such an economy, two types of pure strategy symmetric Nash equilibria in firm wage offers can exist: a no-shirking equilibrium in which all workers exert effort while employed and a shirking equilibrium in which within each firm some workers exert effort while others shirk. The type of equilibrium that prevails in the economy depends crucially on the extent of heterogeneity among the workers and the equilibrium rate at which workers join firms from the unemployment pool.

On existence of undominated pure strategy Nash equilibria in anonymous nonatomic games: a generalization

2003 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 493-498 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulio Codognato ◽  
Sayantan Ghosal
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Nonatomic Games

5. Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria

2009 ◽  
pp. 80-115
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Pure Strategy

Finding all pure strategy Nash equilibria in a planar location game

2011 ◽  
Vol 214 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.M. Díaz-Báñez ◽  
M. Heredia ◽  
B. Pelegrín ◽  
P. Pérez-Lantero ◽  
I. Ventura
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Planar Location

Electricity Markets Cleared by Merit Order—Part I: Finding the Market Outcomes Supported by Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria

2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 361-371 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ebrahim Hasan ◽  
Francisco D. Galiana ◽  
Antonio J. Conejo
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Market Outcomes ◽  
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