Financial Supervision Fragmentation and Central Bank Independence: The Two Sides of the Same Coin?

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Freytag ◽  
Donato Masciandaro
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Financial Supervision ◽  
Two Sides

New Advantages of Tying One’s Hands: Financial Supervision, Monetary Policy and Central Bank Independence

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucia Dalla Pellegrina ◽  
Donato Masciandaro ◽  
Rosaria Vega Pansini
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Financial Supervision

Inside and outside the central bank: Independence and accountability in financial supervision

2008 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 833-848 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donato Masciandaro ◽  
Marc Quintyn ◽  
Michael W. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Financial Supervision

Central bank independence, financial supervision structure and bank soundness: An empirical analysis around the crisis

2015 ◽  
Vol 61 ◽  
pp. S69-S83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Doumpos ◽  
Chrysovalantis Gaganis ◽  
Fotios Pasiouras
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Financial Supervision ◽  
Bank Soundness

Does Central Bank Independence Cause Low Inflation? A Sceptical View

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carsten Hefeker ◽  
Bernd Hayo
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Sceptical View

Central Bank Digital Currency, Inflation Tax, and Central Bank Independence

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ohik Kwon ◽  
Seungduck Lee ◽  
Jaevin Park
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Digital Currency ◽  
Inflation Tax

Central Bank Digital Currency, Tax Evasion, Inflation Tax, and Central Bank Independence

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ohik Kwon ◽  
Seungduck Lee ◽  
Jaevin Park
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Digital Currency ◽  
Inflation Tax

Peaks and Troughs

2019 ◽  
pp. 58-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donato Masciandaro ◽  
Davide Romelli
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Theoretical Perspective ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Banking Supervision ◽  
Macroeconomic Shocks ◽  
Increasing Trend ◽  
The 2008 Financial Crisis ◽  
Exchange Rate Shocks

This chapter investigates the endogenous evolution of central bank institutional design over the past four decades. From a theoretical perspective, it employs a stylized political economy model to highlight some key determinants of the level of central bank independence as a function of macroeconomic shocks and political economy characteristics of countries. It then employs recently developed dynamic indices of central bank design to describe the evolution of central bank independence over the period 1972–2014. In a sample of sixty-five countries, it shows that the increasing trend in central bank independence during 1972–2007 has been reversing after the 2008 financial crisis, mainly due to significant changes to the roles of central banks in banking supervision. The authors find that this evolution can be related to several macroeconomic shocks, such as inflationary, fiscal, and exchange-rate shocks.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document