Analysis on the Legal Nature of ‘Responsibility to Protect’

At present, some states are undertaking military interventions in different parts of the world, contending the ‘legitimacy’ of their i006Evocation of responsibility to protect civilians from a humanitarian crisis. Discussions at international forums concerning the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) are inconclusive about its legal nature and application. While some scholars and states support the doctrine of R2P as being legitimate, others challenge or take a rather sceptical view. Divergent views seem to be originating from its incompatibilities with the rules of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. What is controversial is that the supporters of R2P are mainly from the West, while objections to R2P are from developing countries mainly from West Asia or Africa. This raises concerns about the possibility of future applications of R2P in any of the countries in these regions or other developing countries. The article, analyses the legal nature of R2P in terms of the main principles of international law and other sources of international law and argues that the legitimacy and international legal effect of R2P are uncertain.

Solipsism and Subjectivity

This essay is concerned with solipsism, understood as the extreme sceptical view that I have no knowledge except of my subjective state. A less rough formulation of the view is mooted, inspired by a Quinean combination of naturalism and empiricism. An objection to the resultant position is then considered, based on Putnam’s argument that we are not brains in vats. This objection is first outlined, then pitted against a series of counter-objections. Eventually it is endorsed, but only at the price of exposing the formulation of solipsism in question as not, after all, a satisfactory formulation. This leads to further speculation about the status of solipsism itself. Two of the possibilities that are considered are, first, that it is incoherent and, secondly, that it is inexpressible.

What are these Familiar Words Doing Here?

This essay is concerned with six linguistic moves that we commonly make, each of which is considered in turn. These are: stating rules of representation; representing things categorically; mentioning expressions; saying truly or falsely how things are; saying vaguely how things are; and stating rules of rules of representation. A common-sense view is defended of what is involved in our doing each of these six things against a much more sceptical view emanating from the idea that linguistic behaviour is fundamentally messy. Both the fifth move and the sixth move involve vague concepts, and much of the essay is concerned with developing an approach to various problems and puzzles that attach to such concepts, most notably the sorites paradoxes.

Jayanta on Kumārila’s View of Liberation

In his Nyāyamañjarī, the Nyāya scholar Bhaṭṭa Jayanta expounds on the issue of liberation when commenting on the Nyāyasūtra. In one of its subsections Jayanta discusses a sceptical view about the very possibility of liberation and the view of the Mīmāṁsāka scholar Kumārila. The present author focuses on this section of the Nyāyamañjarī and elucidates the theoretical criteria presupposed there in order to evaluate Jayanta’s attitude towards Kumārila. Jayanta regards Kumārila as one who internally denies liberation while externally admitting its possibility. The present author also sheds light on Jayanta’s view of the means of liberation in comparison to other Naiyāyika positions. Kumārila’s emphasis on the karmic law can be regarded as a trigger for Jayanta to reconsider the previous views of the Naiyāyikas. How to deal with the accumulated karmas while following the karmic law? The present article clarifies the merits of Jayanta’s solution in terms of theory and exegesis.

Big Data and Antitrust Law

The technological revolution we have witnessed in recent years had led to the appearance of a new term within the framework of the digital economy: Big Data. The rise and consolidation of enterprises with major volumes of production based on business models that involve the gathering and processing of personal data has caused misgivings amongst the competition authorities, and has led to a conflict between defenders of the pro-competitive nature of Big Data and those who take a more sceptical view, who have warned of the possibility that these data policies may be used by companies as a tool for creating, consolidating, and extending their positions of power in the market.

The Socratic question: old problems and new trends

The article deals with new approaches to the solution of the so-called “Socratic question” associated with the search for a “historical” Socrates in different sources. The author outlines the history of the issue starting with Schleiermacher and his distinction between the images of Socrates in Plato and Xenophon. It is shown how, at the beginning of the 20th century, a consensus on the authenticity of Plato’s Socrates was reached (Robin, Taylor, Burnet, Maier), and then a sceptical view on the possibility itself to ever solve the “Socratic question” developed (Gigon). Vlastos’ position, which became influential in the late 20th century, is considered: he believed that Socrates of early Platonic dialogues is “historical”, while Socrates of the middle dialogues is a fiction of Plato’s. The second part of the article provides a brief overview of the six editions devoted to Socrates in 2006–2018, and the conclusion is made that there is an obvious trend towards a return to the sceptical position of Gigon in regard to the “Socratic question”.

(Plebiscitary) leader democracy

There is a revival of notions of leader democracy (LD) and plebiscitary leader democracy (PLD) both at the level of politics (e.g. the rhetoric of strong leadership) and in academic debate. This paper focuses largely on the latter, with occasional reference to real-world political developments. The paper (i) sketches changes in the nature of contemporary governance; (ii) argues that Weber’s and Schumpeter’s account of (plebiscitary) leader democracy ((P)LD) as a means of addressing the crisis of representation has marked affinities with current debates; (iii) discusses the possible implications of the re-emergence of a political language of (P)LD. The paper takes a sceptical view, arguing that an appeal to leadership is a symptom of, and contributor towards, the problems it purports to address. Two contemporary defences of (P)LD are discussed: that of the political scientist András Körösényi and that of the political theorist Jeffery Green.

Morality and emotions

Emotions such as anger, fear, grief, envy, compassion, love and jealousy have a close connection to morality. Philosophers have generally agreed that they can pose problems for morality in a variety of ways: by impeding judgment, by making attention uneven and partial, by making the person unstable and excessively needy, by suggesting immoral projects and goals. The place of emotions in moral theories depends on whether they are conceived of merely as impulses without thought or intentional content, or as having some sort of cognitive content. Plato argued that emotions form a part of the soul separate from thought and evaluation, and moved, in the course of his writings, from a sceptical view of their contribution to morality to a more positive appraisal. Aristotle connected emotions closely with judgment and belief, and held that they can be cultivated through moral education to be important components of a virtuous character. The Stoics identified emotions with judgments ascribing a very high value to uncontrolled external things and persons, arguing that all such judgments are false and should be removed. Their cognitive analysis of emotion stands independent of this radical normative thesis, and has been adopted by many philosophers who do not accept it. Modern theories of emotion can be seen as a series of responses and counter-responses to the Stoic challenge. Descartes, Spinoza, Kant and Nietzsche all accepted many of the Stoics’ normative arguments in favour of diminishing the role played by emotions in morality; they differed, however, in the accounts of emotion they proposed. Focusing on compassion or sympathy, Hutcheson, Hume, Rousseau, Adam Smith and Schopenhauer all defended the role of some emotions in morality, returning to a normative position closer to Aristotle’s (though not always with a similarly cognitive analysis). Contemporary views of emotion have been preoccupied with the criticism of reductive accounts that derive from behaviourist psychology. By now, it is once again generally acknowledged that emotions are intelligent parts of the personality that can inform and illuminate as well as motivate. Philosophers’ views have been enriched by advances in cognitive psychology, psychoanalysis and anthropology. Feminist accounts of emotion differ sharply, some insisting that we should validate emotions as important parts of moral character, others that emotions shaped by unjust conditions are unreliable guides.