Pay for Performance: Is CEO Pay Aligned with Performance in Singapore?

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lay Hong Tan ◽  
Tan Chong Huat ◽  
Ch'ng Li Ling
Keyword(s):  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Ceo Pay

Pay-performance sensitivity and corporate governance mechanisms: evidence from Tunisia

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Meriem Ghrab ◽  
Marjène Gana ◽  
Mejda Dakhlaoui
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Simultaneous Equation ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Estimation Model ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Explanatory Variables ◽  
Performance Sensitivity ◽  
Ceo Pay

Purpose The purpose of this study is to analyze the CEO compensation sensitivity to firm performance, termed as the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) in the Tunisian context and to test the robustness of this relationship when corporate governance (CG) mechanisms are considered. Design/methodology/approach The consideration of past executive pay as one of the explanatory variables makes this estimation model a dynamic one. Furthermore, to avoid the problem of endogeneity, this study uses the system-GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). For robustness check, this study aims to use a simultaneous equation approach (three-stage least squares [3SLS]) to estimate the link between performance and CEO pay with a set of CG mechanisms to control for possible simultaneous interdependencies. Findings Using a sample of 336 firm-years from Tunisia over the 2009–2015 periods, this study finds strong evidence that the pay-performance relationship is insignificant and negative, and it becomes more negative or remains insignificant after introducing CG mechanisms consistently with the managerial power approach. The findings are robust to the use of alternative performance measures. This study provides new empirical evidence that CEOs of Tunisian firms abuse extracting rents independently of firm performance. Originality/value This study contributes to the unexamined research on PPS in a frontier market. This study also shows the ineffectiveness of the Tunisian CG structure and thus recommends for the legislator to impose a mandatory CG guide.

Placing their bets: The influence of strategic investment on CEO pay‐for‐performance

2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (12) ◽  
pp. 2047-2077 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Shi ◽  
Brian L. Connelly ◽  
Jeremy D. Mackey ◽  
Abhinav Gupta
Keyword(s):  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Strategic Investment ◽  
Ceo Pay

Effectiveness of CEO pay-for-performance

2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chandra S Mishra ◽  
Daniel L McConaughy ◽  
David H Gobeli
Keyword(s):  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Ceo Pay

CEO Pay for Performance: The Solution to Managerial Power

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ira T. Kay
Keyword(s):  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
Ceo Pay

scholarly journals CEO Pay-For-Performance Heterogeneity Using Quantile Regression

2010 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin F. Hallock ◽  
Regina Madalozzo ◽  
Clayton G. Reck
Keyword(s):  
Quantile Regression ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Performance Heterogeneity

CEO Pay for Performance Sensitivity in the Restaurant Industry: What Makes it Move?

2008 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 160-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melih Madanoglu ◽  
Ersem Karadag
Keyword(s):  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Restaurant Industry ◽  
Performance Sensitivity ◽  
Ceo Pay

scholarly journals Board compensation committees: CEO pay and market cap performance with implications for investors

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 180-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugh Grove ◽  
Maclyn Clouse
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Weighted Average ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Metal Mining ◽  
Primary Metal ◽  
Market Capitalization ◽  
Top Executives ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Compensation Committees

Board of Directors’ compensation committees currently have no pay provisions requiring CEO or top executives’ compensation claw-backs for market capitalization destruction which could have huge impacts on such top executive pay. For example, CEO pay was correlated with market capitalization performance for 24 companies in the metal mining, primary metal, and coal mining industries. Simple correlation tests of 2013 total CEO pay with market capitalization destruction over the five-year period, January 2011 through December 2015, yielded a 74% weighted average strong correlation. The total annual pay for these 24 CEOs was $198 million or an estimated $1 billion over the five-year period from 2011-2015. During this same five-year period, the market capitalization for these 24 companies decreased 73% or $180 billion. During this same five-year time period, the S&P 500 Index increased 63%. Some corporate governance researchers (Kostyuk, 2014 and Hilb, 2008) have advocated: “Pay for Performance, not Presence” which could include such correlations with claw-back provisions as part of executive compensation packages from Board of Directors’ compensation committees.

scholarly journals Pay for performance: Beating "best practices"

2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 36-40
Author(s):  
Marc Hodak
Keyword(s):  
Best Practices ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Value Creation ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Compensation Plans ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Compensation Plan ◽  
Compensation Design

Widespread criticism of CEO pay packages have spurred directors to engage in a diligent search for best practices. This vigilance is transforming the process of executive compensation design, administration and oversight at many major public companies. But have all these process changes improved the compensation plans? We conducted empirical research on the way various compensation structures work for or against shareholder value creation. We looked at S&P 500 executive compensation plan data, supplemented by conversations with hundreds of executives and consultants. Against this standard, the evidence indicates that certain practices prove out favorably; some with plausible rationales have questionable value, at best, and some are clearly counter productive.

scholarly journals The Impact of Firm Financial Efficiency on Executive Compensation of United States Apparel Stores Industry: An Application of Panel Data Envelopment Analysis

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 165
Author(s):  
Herman Sahni ◽  
Christian Nsiah
Keyword(s):  
Data Envelopment Analysis ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Scale Efficiency ◽  
Data Envelopment ◽  
Financial Efficiency ◽  
Performance Framework ◽  
The Us ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
The Impact

This study examines the effect of firm financial efficiency on executive compensation with an emphasis on the US apparel industry. We find that both annual efficiency levels and cumulative efficiency changes obtained from the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) are positively associated with CEO pay. The effect is stronger for technological changes and changes in scale efficiency. Our results seem to support the pay-for-efficiency paradigm, a stricter version of the pay-for-performance framework under the efficient contracting explanation for CEO pay.

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