Equilibrium in a Family of Common-Value First-Price Auctions with Differential Information

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Malueg ◽  
Ram Orzach
Author(s):  
Sergio O. Parreiras

I study affiliated, pure common-value auctions with ex-ante asymmetric buyers. For the two-buyer case I characterize and prove uniqueness of the equilibrium of hybrid auctions where the payment is a weighted average of the highest and second-highest bids. A recursive method to explicitly compute the equilibrium is presented. It is shown that any hybrid auction yields at least as much revenue as the first-price auction. In particular, the equilibrium of the second-price auction, obtained in the limit by letting the weight of the highest bid go to zero, revenue-dominates the first-price auction.


2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 215-253
Author(s):  
Robert Griffin ◽  
Christopher Anderson
Keyword(s):  

1981 ◽  
Vol 18 (01) ◽  
pp. 190-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guy Latouche

A queueing system with exponential service and correlated arrivals is analysed. Each interarrival time is exponentially distributed. The parameter of the interarrival time distribution depends on the parameter for the preceding arrival, according to a Markov chain. The parameters of the interarrival time distributions are chosen to be equal to a common value plus a factor ofε, where ε is a small number. Successive arrivals are then weakly correlated. The stability condition is found and it is shown that the system has a stationary probability vector of matrix-geometric form. Furthermore, it is shown that the stationary probabilities for the number of customers in the system, are analytic functions ofε, for sufficiently smallε, and depend more on the variability in the interarrival time distribution, than on the correlations.


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