The service pricing strategies and the strategic behavior of customers in an unobservable Markovian queue with unreliable server

A Stackelberg game is used to study the service pricing and the strategic behavior of customers in an unreliable and totally unobservable M/M/1 queue under a reward-cost structure. At the first stage, the server manager, acting as a leader, chooses a service price and, at the second stage, a customer, arriving at the system and acting as a follower, chooses to join the system or an outside opportunity, knowing only the service price imposed by the server manager and the system parameters. We show that the constructed game admits an equilibrium and we give explicit forms of server manager and customers equilibrium behavioral strategies. The results of the proposed model show that the assumption that customers are risk-neutral is fundamental for the standard approach usually used. Moreover, we determine the socially optimal price that maximizes the social welfare and we compare it to the Stackelberg equilibrium. We illustrate, by numerical examples, the effect of some system parameters on the equilibrium service price and the revenue of the server manager.

Equilibrium analysis of cloud user request based on the Markov queue with variable vacation and vacation interruption

This paper considers the equilibrium balking behavior of customers in a single-server Markovian queue with variable vacation and vacation interruption, where the server can switch across four states: vacation, working vacation, idle period, and busy period. Once the queue becomes empty, the server commences a working vacation and slows down its service rate. However, this period may be interrupted anytime by the vacation interruption. Upon the completion of a working vacation, the server takes a vacation in a probability-based manner and stops service if the system is empty. The system stays idle after a vacation until a new customer arrives. The comparisons between the equilibrium balking strategy of customers and the optimal expected social benefit per time unit for each type of queue are elucidated and the inconsistency between the individual optimization and the social optimization is revealed. Moreover, the sensitivity of the expected social benefit and the equilibrium threshold with respect to the several parameters as well as diverse precision levels is illustrated through numerical examples in a competitive cloud environment.

ANFIS and Cost Optimization for Markovian Queue with Operational Vacation

In this paper, we investigate the M/M/1/N single server finite capacity Markovian queueing model with operational vacation and impatient behavior of the customers. To recover the server broken down during a busy period, M-threshold recovery policy along with set-up is used. Using the inflow and outflow transition rates, the state probabilities equations for different system states are constructed. For computing the stationary queue length, matrix-geometric analytic is performed. The sensitivity analysis is carried for the validation of the system performance measures. To examine the scope of the adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system (ANFIS), computational results are presented using matric-geometric and ANFIS approaches.

ON MARKOVIAN QUEUES WITH SINGLE WORKING VACATION AND BERNOULLI INTERRUPTIONS

This paper considers the customers’ equilibrium and socially optimal joining–balking behavior in a single-server Markovian queue with a single working vacation and Bernoulli interruptions. The model is motivated by practical service systems where the service rate can be adjusted according to whether or not the system is empty. Specifically, we focus on a single-server queue in which the server's service rate is reduced from a regular to a lower one when the system becomes empty. This lower rate period is called a working vacation for the server which may represent that part of the service facility is under a maintenance process or works on other non-queueing job, or simply for saving the energy (for a machine server case). In this paper, we assume that the working vacation period is terminated after a random period or with probability p after serving a customer in a non-empty system. Such a system is called a queue with single working vacation and Bernoulli interruptions. Customers are strategic and can make choice of joining or balking based on different levels of system information. We consider four scenarios: fully observable, almost observable, almost unobservable, and fully unobservable queue cases. Under a reward-cost structure, we analyze the customer's equilibrium and social-optimal strategies. In addition, the effects of system parameters on optimal strategies are illustrated by numerical examples.