scholarly journals Ability as ‘performance’: analyzing the able-ness of ‘life’ through a critical study of The Shawshank Redemption and The Dark Knight

Author(s):  
Souradip Bhattacharyya ◽  

This article deals closely with the relation between the ability and state of being alive. It asks an elemental question: what does the word ‘life’ remind us of? While ‘life’ may generically be defined as the ability to do all that signifies the act of living, a more political way of defining ‘life’ would be to consider it as the medium of being alive as human or, an individual person’s existence. The generic definition of ‘life’ given above may suffer from reductionism if ‘ability’ is interpreted as a thing-in-itself, natural to mankind as an inherent, embedded process. This article, therefore, aims to analyze life by stepping out of this biological method of understanding and concentrates on the socio-economic and cultural nexus in which the ability to do is produced. It has chosen cinema as a medium of analysis because cinema does not dwell in a (cinematic) utopian space of its own, but it represents reality as much as it affects reality through the audio-visual experience of the audience.

2021 ◽  
pp. 353-365
Author(s):  
Herbert Spencer ◽  
Michael Taylor

Author(s):  
John Maynard Smith ◽  
Eors Szathmary

Imagine that, when the first spacemen step out of their craft onto the surface of one of the moons of Jupiter, they are confronted by an object the size of a horse, rolling towards them on wheels, and bearing on its back a concave disc pointing towards the Sun. They will at once conclude that the object is alive, or has been made by something alive. If all they find is a purple smear on the surface of the rocks, they will have to work harder to decide. This is the phenotypic approach to the definition of life: a thing is alive if it has parts, or ‘organs’, which perform functions. William Paley explained the machine-like nature of life by the existence of a creator: today, we would invoke natural selection. There are, however, dangers in assuming that any entity with the properties of a self-regulating machine is alive, or an artefact. In section 2.2, we tell the story of a self-regulating atomic reactor, the Oklo reactor, which is neither. This story can be taken in one of three ways. First, it shows the dangers of the phenotypic definition of life: not all complex entities are alive. Second, it illustrates how the accidents of history can give rise spontaneously to surprisingly complex machine-like entities. The relevance of this to the origin of life is obvious. In essence, the problem is the following. How could chemical and physical processes give rise, without natural selection, to entities capable of hereditary replication, which would therefore, from then on, evolve by natural selection? The Oklo reactor is an example of what can happen. Finally, section 2.2 can simply be skipped: the events were interesting, but do not resemble in detail those that led to the origin of life on Earth. There is an alternative to the phenotypic definition of life. It is to define as alive any entities that have the properties of multiplication, variation and heredity. The logic behind this definition, first proposed by Muller (1966), is that a population of entities with these properties will evolve by natural selection, and hence can be expected to acquire the complex adaptations for survival and reproduction that are characteristic of living things.


2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerard A. J. M. Jagers op Akkerhuis

2013 ◽  
Vol 133 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Chodasewicz

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