A Primer on the Economics of Prescription Pharmaceutical Pricing in Health Insurance Markets

2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernst R. Berndt ◽  
Thomas McGuire ◽  
Joseph P. Newhouse

The pricing of medical products and services in the U.S. is notoriously complex. In health care, supply prices (those received by the manufacturer) are distinct from demand prices (those paid by the patient) due to health insurance. The insurer, in designing the benefit, decides what prices patients pay out-of-pocket for drugs and other products. In this primer we characterize cost and supply conditions in markets for generic and branded drugs, and apply basic tools of microeconomics to describe how an insurer, acting on behalf of its enrollees, would set demand prices for drugs. Importantly, we show how the market structure on the supply side, characterized alternatively by monopoly (unique brands), Bertrand differentiated product markets (therapeutic competition) and competition (generics), influences the insurer’s choices about demand prices. This perspective sheds light on the choice of coinsurance versus copayments, the structure of tiered formularies, and developments in the retail market.

2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 167-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan C. Monheit ◽  
Joel C. Cantor ◽  
Margaret Koller ◽  
Kimberley S. Fox

2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (Supplement) ◽  
pp. 75-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob Glazer ◽  
Thomas G. McGuire

Abstract In many countries, competition among health plans or sickness funds raises issues of risk selection. Funds may discourage or encourage potential enrollees from joining, and these actions may have efficiency or fairness implications. This article reviews the experience in the U.S., and comments on the evidence for risk selection in Germany. There is little evidence that risk selection causes efficiency problems in Germany, but risk selection does lead to an inequality in contribution rates. A simple approach to equalizing contribution rates that does not involve risk adjustment is presented and discussed.


Author(s):  
Sherman Folland ◽  
Allen C. Goodman ◽  
Miron Stano

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