AbstractFirst, this chapter will briefly review the contents of each previous chapter. Chapter 10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0_2 examined the historical background from the immediate aftermath of World War II to the establishment of the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Act in 1992. Chapter 10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0_3 considered the evolution of Japan’s peacekeeping policy under the PKO Act from 1992 to 2012. Chapter 10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0_4 investigated the transformation of Japan’s peacekeeping policy under the second Abe administration, especially during the period from 2013 to 2017. Chapters 10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0_5, 10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0_6, 10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0_7, and 10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0_8 considered the cases of Cambodia, East Timor, Haiti, and South Sudan respectively. Second, this chapter will analyze the consequences of Japan’s pursuit of the trends of “robustness” and “integration.” Third, we will consider possible explanations behind the withdrawal of the Japan Engineering Groups from South Sudan in 2017. Fourth, we will demonstrate that troop deployment to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) has become commonly difficult for the Global North countries, causing a shift in focus away from personnel contributions to more material UNPKO commitments. Fourth, this chapter will illustrate how the Global North is still trying to make personnel contributions to UNPKOs wherever possible. Lastly, we will discuss what Japan can do from now on in its peacekeeping policy, or more broadly its International Peace Cooperation commitment.
Conclusion: Japan’s Search for a New Direction in Peacekeeping
