Recent Developments in Japan’s International Peace Cooperation Under the Second Abe Government 2012–2020

This chapter will consider the noteworthy changes in Japan’s peacekeeping policy under the second Abe administration (2012–2020), with special emphasis on the period between 2013 and 2017. Since its outset in the early 1990s, Japan’s peacekeeping policy had been gradually shaped by the trends of “integration” and the “robustness” in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs), but various problems remained unsolved, especially in terms of “robustness.” With the return of Prime Minister Abe at the end of 2012, reforms to follow the trend of “robustness” were carried out as part of his all-inclusive renovation of Japan’s security policy, namely the Peace and Security Legislation, to resolve numerous long-standing problems in the field. With this in mind, this chapter starts by considering new developments in Japan’s security policy as a whole before examining how these sweeping reforms transformed the quality of Japan’s peacekeeping, paying special attention to the newly added roles, such as the “coming-to-aid” duty. This chapter will also trace moves toward “integration,” especially regarding the “All Japan” approach.

Conclusion: Japan’s Search for a New Direction in Peacekeeping

First, this chapter will briefly review the contents of each previous chapter. Chapter 10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0_2 examined the historical background from the immediate aftermath of World War II to the establishment of the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Act in 1992. Chapter 10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0_3 considered the evolution of Japan’s peacekeeping policy under the PKO Act from 1992 to 2012. Chapter 10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0_4 investigated the transformation of Japan’s peacekeeping policy under the second Abe administration, especially during the period from 2013 to 2017. Chapters 10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0_5, 10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0_6, 10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0_7, and 10.1007/978-3-030-88509-0_8 considered the cases of Cambodia, East Timor, Haiti, and South Sudan respectively. Second, this chapter will analyze the consequences of Japan’s pursuit of the trends of “robustness” and “integration.” Third, we will consider possible explanations behind the withdrawal of the Japan Engineering Groups from South Sudan in 2017. Fourth, we will demonstrate that troop deployment to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) has become commonly difficult for the Global North countries, causing a shift in focus away from personnel contributions to more material UNPKO commitments. Fourth, this chapter will illustrate how the Global North is still trying to make personnel contributions to UNPKOs wherever possible. Lastly, we will discuss what Japan can do from now on in its peacekeeping policy, or more broadly its International Peace Cooperation commitment.

Haiti: The Development of “Seamless” Assistance from Disaster Relief to UNPKOs

In this chapter, we will examine Japan’s response to a complex crisis in Haiti, in which a natural disaster and civil unrest were compounded. Persistent insecurity and confusion in Haiti, albeit under the presence of an ongoing United Nations Peacekeeping Operation (UNPKO), further deteriorated after the great earthquake in 2010. This challenge unexpectedly propelled Japan’s move toward closer “integration,” since several layers of civil-military cooperation rapidly developed to cope with the complicated emergency in post-earthquake Haiti. First, the Government of Japan (GoJ) deployed a civilian medical team and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) emergency medical assistance unit (hereafter, the SDF medical unit) under the Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) Act. Following the SDF medical unit’s JDR work, the Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS) carried on with medical assistance. Second, once emergency medical support ended, an SDF contingent was dispatched under the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Act. The Japan Engineering Groups’ (JEG’s) engagement in reconstruction served as a useful opportunity for the GoJ to refine the “All Japan” approach, further encouraging Japan’s inclination toward “integration.” Meanwhile, the experience in Haiti shed light on the gap in the legal assumptions between the JDR Act and the PKO Act, since neither of them anticipated the protection of civil JDR teams in insecurity.

South Sudan: The SDF and “Protection of Civilians”

The Japan Engineering Groups (JEG) deployment to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) from 2012 to 2017 exhibited consecutive aspects of “integration” and “robustness.” During the first two years, Japan’s method of “integration,” or the “All Japan” approach, fit well with UNMISS’s focus on statebuilding. It yielded various outcomes, not only in the restoration of facilities and infrastructure (e.g., road construction) but also in the nonengineering support provided to the locals (e.g., job training). With the outbreak of de facto civil war in December 2013, however, UNMISS’s top priority moved from statebuilding to Protection of Civilians (PoC), thereby intensifying inclinations toward “robustness.” Afterward, the JEG mostly focused on the construction of a PoC site, that is, a shelter for evacuated locals and internally displaced people. While security in South Sudan continued to deteriorate, the amendment to the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Act as part of the 2015 Peace and Security Legislation enabled the Government of Japan (GoJ) to assign the JEG to partial security missions, such as the “coming-to-aid” duty. In the end, however, the GoJ abruptly withdrew the JEG in May 2017, thereby discontinuing the series of SDF deployments to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations since 1992.

Introduction: The Pursuit of “Integration” and “Robustness” in Japan’s Peacekeeping Policy

Here we will present two research questions: first, why did Japan suddenly discontinue a quarter-century history of troop contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) in 2017; second, is there any possibility of resuming large-scale military deployment. Hypothetically, we will argue that Japan’s retreat from South Sudan in 2017 should be regarded not as the revival of old anti-militarism but as a recent tendency of reluctance among the Global North countries, concerning the personnel deployment to the UNPKOs. Since the start in 1992, Japan had deployed only the limited personnel contribution under the strict constitutional ban. To overcome this situation, Japan had tried to trace the global trends of “robustness” and “integration”: the former encourages more proactive use of arms for peacekeepers to remove obstacles for the UNPKOs, while the latter promotes peacebuilding-like military roles along with the cooperation with civilians. In the late 2010s, however, Japan could no longer accommodate the recent international trends, mainly due to the increasing insecurity in the UNPKOs today. Likewise, the other Global North countries had also become hesitant for the personnel contribution to the UNPKOs. We will argue that Japan’s retreat falls in the common trend among the Global North countries.

The Historical Background to Japan’s Peacekeeping Policy from the Early Postwar Era to the Establishment of the PKO Act 1945–1992

In this chapter, we will review the evolution of Japan’s peacekeeping policy from the immediate aftermath of Japan’s defeat in 1945 to the enactment of the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Act in 1992. In the first section, we will look at the historical background during the postwar period (in this book, the term “postwar” denotes the period in Japan from its defeat in World War II in 1945 to the end of the Cold War in around 1990), including the rise of anti-militarism, the hidden rearmament, the establishment of the de facto ban on overseas military dispatch, the rejection of the UN’s request for the Self-Defense Forces’ (SDF’s) deployment to a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation (UNPKO) and the aborted plan to dispatch a minesweeper to the Persian Gulf. This section will also examine the Government of Japan’s legal standpoint about the possibility of SDF deployment to a UNPKO. In the second section, we will clarify how the Gulf Crisis/War in 1990–1991 made Japan abandon the taboo against overseas military dispatch. Then, we will review the course of the challenging lawmaking process of the PKO Act, which was finally passed in June 1992. Lastly, we will see the restrictions inserted into the PKO Act, such as the so-called Five Principles.