Image and Word in Postmodern Poetry: Friederike Mayröcker’s BROTWOLKE

This article explores the interplay of visual arts and poetic images in postmodern poetry, focusing on the case of Friederike Mayröcker’s poem BROTWOLKE, nach Karla Woisnitza (1996) [BREADCLOUD, after Karla Woisnitza]. The article shows that BROTWOLKE belongs to a group of texts whose titles indicate an ekphrasis or an intermedial quality, but whose specific point of reference is absent. Rather than referencing to a specific painting, the poem thus showcases different aspects of the visual. Offering a close reading of the poem, the article explores Mayröcker’s special technique of image-writing and its dynamic effect on the reader. The article argues that the poem both “shows the word” and “writes the image.” It is shown that Mayröcker’s stream-of-consciousness is a process that refers to the act of writing in the first place and then to an inventory of texts and images that float the text as a stream of sense-data.

Being Somewhere

To understand the experience of being present somewhere else, via a digital environment, we start by considering how we can experience being anywhere. We present several different philosophical and psychological perspectives on this, stressing the importance of perception. Each has something to offer and add to our understanding of digital travel. We compare four philosophical views: representationalism, relationism, enactivism and the sense-data view. Each has its strengths and weaknesses, but relationism is best placed to accommodate perceptual illusions, which is a prevalent view of the psychological nature of telepresence experiences. As suggested by enactivism and the direct perception approach, the possibilities for action in the world are important to the nature of our experience of places. This, in turn, is influenced by the characteristics of the world in which we act, through affordances.

Attention, Distraction and the Distribution of the Senses: “Slow”, “Reflexive” and “Contemplative” between Cinema and the Museum

A classic definition of attention designates it as “the selective perception of a particular stimulus, sustained by means of concentration and the willing exclusion of interfering sense-data”. In our sense-data rich environments, attention has become a scarce commodity, increasingly valued and sought after, but with the paradoxical consequence that the very pursuit of attention cannot but register as distraction. How do artists confront and art spaces cope with this paradox, and how has the moving image in the museum changed the articulation of time, space and information that is narrative?

Hermann Cohen and His Idea of the Logic of Pure Knowledge

Hermann Cohen, as it is well known, criticised the Kantian notion of the thing-in-itself. And before him the Kantian thing-in-itself was criticised by Fichte and other German idealists. Probably for this reason, Hermann Cohen is sometimes regarded as a person who said things similar to Fichte. This gives a completely wrong perspective, making it impossible to understand the philosopher's ideas. The basis for his critique of the Kantian thing-in-itself is quite different from the motives, determining the criticism of Kant in the classical German Idealism. Such interpretation does not allow to see close connection of Cohen's theoretical philosophy with revolution in physics which took place at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The article explains how Cohen's demand that pure thinking must form its own content is connected with transformations taking place in physics and mathematics, and the peculiarity of Cohen's understanding of idealism is demonstrated: for him, correct idealism must realize that autonomous, free thinking should work seriously with sense data. The closeness of Cohen's ideas to the postpositivist thesis of the theory-ladenness of observation is explained. For Cohen, serious work with sense data is opposite to uncritical acceptance of them as given. The origin of scientific thinking is thinking itself. It responds to the challenge of sensory material by creating its own constructs. Mathematized natural science becomes for Cohen both an example and a confirmation of this thesis. For him, what is real is what is described in the language of mathematical analysis, i.e. continuous processes, in spite of the fact that any data are discrete. It is shown that the source of Cohen's assertions on this issue is in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, namely in the doctrine of the Principles of pure natural science and, more specifically, in the Anticipations of Perception. Cohen's conviction of the constructive character of the theories of mathematized natural science is confirmed in the article by references to the authority of A. Einstein.

What is the myth of the given?

The idea of ‘the given’ and its alleged problematic status as most famously articulated by Sellars (1956, 1981) continues to be at the center of heated controversies about foundationalism in epistemology, about ‘conceptualism’ and nonconceptual content in the philosophy of perception, and about the nature of the experiential given in phenomenology and in the cognitive sciences. I argue that the question of just what the myth of the given is supposed to be in the first place is more complex than has typically been supposed in these debates, and that clarification of this prior question has surprising consequences. Foundationalism was only one of Sellars’s targets, and this not only in the familiar sense that the more fundamental issues at stake concern the very ‘objective purport’ or intentionality of our empirical thinking in general. When pushed further still, Sellars’s critique in fact hinged on his diagnoses of implicit framework-relative or ‘categorial’ metaphysical presuppositions he exposes in givenist views. Furthermore, the key to his critique accordingly turns out to rest on implicit assumptions concerning the in principle revisability or replaceability of any such presuppositions, whether ‘innate’ or acquired, and including Sellars’s own. Another key result is that widespread assumptions that Sellars’s famous critique is simply inapplicable or irrelevant to either ‘thin’ nonconceptualist views of the given (such as C. I. Lewis’s), since they are ‘non-epistemic’; or alternatively, irrelevant to ‘thick’ conceptualist and phenomenological analyses (since they, too, reject ‘sense-data’ or the ‘bare given’)–both turn out to be mistaken.

Risk on Dental Porphyromonas with Esophageal Cancer: A Guangdong Elderly Cohort Study

Objective: To investigate the relationship between Dental Porphyromonas Concentration and Esophageal Cancer in Guangdong, China. Methods: A total of 2031 research objects were included from 2016 and follow-up for 6 years, greater than 65 years old, all are from outpatient department with esophageal foreign body sense. Data are retrospectively analyzing in year 2021. There were 43 cases found to developed esophageal cancer, 7 of them are from exposure group, (high dental porphyromonas group) and 36 from control. Two groups of individuals were retrieved from the Guangdong Provincial Hospital database between year 2016 June to 2021 June. Age, gender, race and region are strictly matched. Both of case and the controls are processing through: a. Specimen collection, b. DNA extraction, c. High-throughput sequencing (screening stage), d. Quantitative determination of target bacteria in the samples of the experimental group by Q-PCR, e. Statistical analysis of experimental data. Two sample t-test are using to detect whether have difference on concentration of Dental Porphyromonas between cases and control group. SAS 15 windows version is used as analytic tools. Results: We found that the odds on having Esophageal Cancer from high dental porphyromonas group is 1.23 times greater than controls (OR=1.23). Also, mean of concentration on Dental Porphyromonas in Esophageal Cancer Group (Cases) are statistically higher than Healthy controls, with a mean of 0.0157 in cases versus 0.0025 in controls, which is 6.54 times higher in Esophageal Group, compare with control group, with P<0.001. Where Hot Tea Drinking Habit are found associated with Esophageal Cancer, with the Odds Ratio (OR) on 1.30, as well as current smoking on an 1.13 odds ratio. Conclusion: The cohort study had found some significant associations on high Dental Porphyromonas with Esophageal Cancer Patient, where this association still lacks of proof to be a determinate causal relationship. Further greater populational longitudinal studies are need to carry out to find out more causal association, as well as finding out Dental Porphyromonas relevant Social Determinant on Esophageal Cancer.

A Secure Truth Discovery for Data Aggregation in Mobile Crowd Sensing

With the rapid development of portable mobile devices, mobile crowd sensing systems (MCS) have been widely studied. However, the sensing data provided by participants in MCS applications is always unreliable, which affects the service quality of the system, and the truth discovery technology can effectively obtain true values from the data provided by multiple users. At the same time, privacy leaks also restrict users’ enthusiasm for participating in the MCS. Based on this, our paper proposes a secure truth discovery for data aggregation in crowd sensing systems, STDDA, which iteratively calculates user weights and true values to obtain real object data. In order to protect the privacy of data, STDDA divides users into several clusters, and users in the clusters ensure the privacy of data by adding secret random numbers to the perceived data. At the same time, the cluster head node uses the secure sum protocol to obtain the aggregation result of the sense data and uploads it to the server so that the server cannot obtain the sense data and weight of individual users, further ensuring the privacy of the user’s sense data and weight. In addition, using the truth discovery method, STDDA provides corresponding processing mechanisms for users’ dynamic joining and exiting, which enhances the robustness of the system. Experimental results show that STDDA has the characteristics of high accuracy, low communication, and high security.

Sensation and the Grammar of Life

Anscombe’s published writings, lectures, and notes on sensation offer material for a sophisticated critique of philosophical theories of perception and a novel analysis of the concept of sensation. Her philosophy of perception begins with the traditional question, ‘What are the objects of sensation?’, but the response is a grammatical rather than ontological enquiry. What, she asks, are the characteristics of the grammatical object of sensation verbs? Anscombe’s answer is: sensation verbs take ‘intentional objects’, where an ‘intentional object’ is a description which has the characteristics of the concept of intention—characteristics elucidated in detail in her Intention. This allows Anscombe to reject two opposing positions—that the objects of sensation are sense data, and that they are ordinary objects. Both views, she argues, fail to recognize the grammatical fact that verbs of sensation take intentional objects. This chapter sets out Anscombe’s analysis and outlines the case for a grammatical methodology. Along the way, it will be shown that Anscombe’s philosophy of perception should not be read as forerunning contemporary representationalism.