Images and Arms Control: Perceptions of the Soviet Union in the Reagan Administration.

1992 ◽  
Vol 107 (2) ◽  
pp. 331
Author(s):  
Robert Jervis ◽  
Keith L. Shimko
1982 ◽  
Vol 15 (01) ◽  
pp. 32-39
Author(s):  
Joseph S. Nye

In the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan and the advent of the Reagan Administration, cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union seems to have diminished, particularly in the area of arms control. Nuclear non-proliferation is the oldest area of Soviet-American cooperation in arms control, dating back to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the 1950s. But the fact that the two countries have a common interest does not mean that there is necessarily an equal interest or that it can survive the current tension.Some analysts argue that the Soviet Union has more at risk from proliferation than does the United States. For example, many of the potential new entrants to nuclear weapons status–India, Pakistan, Korea, Taiwan, Iraq–are countries geographically close to the Soviet Union and distant from the United States. Thus, it could be argued that the Soviet Union has more to fear than we do, and from the zero-sum perspective of U.S.-Soviet hostility, further proliferation may hurt the Soviet Union more than the United States. To judge whether this is a sensible basis for policy, or whether cooperative action is a better basis requires a closer look at the skeptical arguments.


This book uses trust—with its emotional and predictive aspects—to explore international relations in the second half of the Cold War, beginning with the late 1960s. The détente of the 1970s led to the development of some limited trust between the United States and the Soviet Union, which lessened international tensions and enabled advances in areas such as arms control. However, it also created uncertainty in other areas, especially on the part of smaller states that depended on their alliance leaders for protection. The chapters in this volume look at how the “emotional” side of the conflict affected the dynamics of various Cold War relations: between the superpowers, within the two ideological blocs, and inside individual countries on the margins of the East–West confrontation.


Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-115
Author(s):  
Jon Brook Wolfsthal

America survived the nuclear age through a complex combination of diplomatic and military decisions, and a good deal of luck. One of the tools that proved its value in both reducing the risks of nuclear use and setting rules for the ongoing nuclear competition were negotiated, legally binding, and verified arms control agreements. Such pacts between the United States and the Soviet Union arguably prevented the nuclear arms racing from getting worse and helped both sides climb off the Cold War nuclear precipice. Several important agreements remain in place between the United States and Russia, to the benefit of both states. Arms control is under threat, however, from domestic forces in the United States and from Russian actions that range from treaty violations to the broader weaponization of risk. But arms control can and should play a useful role in reducing the risk of nuclear war and forging a new agreement between Moscow and Washington on the new rules of the nuclear road.


Author(s):  
Beth A. Fischer

Did President Reagan launch a military buildup so as toforce the USSR to collapse, as triumphalists claim?In this view Reagan sought to entice Moscow into an arms race that it could not afford, thus forcing it into bankruptcy. This argument rests on two assumptions. The first is that Reagan officials believed the Soviet Union to be so fragile that it could be nudged to collapse. The second is that the administration intended to force the USSR to implode. This chapter finds both assumptions wanting. Although the president believed the USSR was unsustainable in the long run, virtually all of his advisers disagreed. They viewed Moscow as a formidable adversary that would continue to challenge the West for the foreseeable future. Moreover, high-ranking officials in the Reagan administration have rejected the claim that they sought to force the USSR to collapse.The objective was to pressure the Soviets to agree to arms reduction. President Reagan sought to eliminate nuclear weapons, and officials mistakenly believed that Moscow would not agree to reduce its arsenal until confronted with a strong and menacing adversary. Paradoxically, the buildup was intended to lead to arms reductions.This policy was called “peace through strength.”


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