The International Court of Prize

1911 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 302-324
Author(s):  
James Brown Scott

On February 15, 1911, the Senate of the United States advised and consented to the ratification of the International Prize Court Convention adopted by the Second Hague Peace Conference and signed by the American delegates October 18, 1907. Although transmitted to the Senate with the various Hague conventions on February 27, 1908, and favorably recommended by the President and Secretary of State, action upon the convention was deferred by the Committee on Foreign Relations because the convention in its original form involved an appeal from the Supreme Court of the United States to the international court at The Hague. This feature of the otherwise acceptable convention raised doubts as to its constitutionality, because Article 3, section 1, of the Constitution provides that “ the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court.” An appeal from the Supreme Court to the court at The Hague seemed to some inconsistent with this provision, for a court can not be considered supreme if an appeal lies from its decisions. To this it may be answered that the court to be established at The Hague is not a court of the United States, and, therefore, is not contemplated by the Constitution; for the Hague court is a diplomatic tribunal for the settlement of questions which would otherwise be adjusted by diplomacy, or referred to a mixed commission specially constituted for their determination, or which if not determined by either of these methods, might result in war.

1985 ◽  
Vol 79 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malvina Halberstam

Among the more controversial provisions of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised), are the sections dealing with the act of state doctrine in Tentative Draft No. 4. Section 428 provides: “Subject to §429, courts in the United States will refrain from examining the validity of an act of a foreign state taken in its sovereign capacity within the state’s own territory.” This provision, of course, is based on the Supreme Court decision in Sabbatino. The Court there stated, “the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government” even if it is alleged that the taking is contrary to international law.


1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 704-708
Author(s):  
Frederic L. Kirgis

In 1968 the United States Supreme Court decided Zschernig v. Miller, a foreign relations case that has been characterized as unique. An Oregon probate statute provided for escheat of a decedent’s property in preference to a nonresident alien’s claim to inherit it unless the alien’s country (1) allowed United States citizens to inherit under similar circumstances, (2) allowed U.S. citizens to receive payment here of funds inherited there, and (3) gave foreign heirs the right to receive the proceeds of Oregon estates without confiscation. Residents of then East Germany, who were the heirs of an Oregon decedent, challenged the constitutionality of the statute. The Supreme Court struck down the statute, finding that Oregon probate and appellate judges were basing their decisions on “foreign policy attitudes, the freezing or thawing of the ‘cold war.’”


2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (3) ◽  
pp. 551-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Charnovitz

Although “[tjreaties are the law of the land, and a rule of decision in all courts,” the president and the courts may sometimes be powerless to achieve compliance with a U.S. treaty. That was the puzzling outcome of Medellin v. Texas. Even though the Supreme Court declared that the United States has an international obligation to comply with the Avena judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Court invalidated the president’s memorandum directing Texas and other errant states to comply.


Author(s):  
Randy E. Barnett

This chapter applies the concepts of interpretation and construction to the contentious issue of judicial review and examines the originalist evidence that overwhelmingly supports the judicial power to nullify unconstitutional laws. According to Article III of the Constitution: “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such Courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” The Constitution does not say explicitly that the “Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as may be established by Congress, shall have power to nullify a Law enacted by Congress and signed by the President if the Law is unconstitutional.” The absence of a clearly expressed grant of power has moved some critics of judicial review to question its legitimacy. The chapter also considers the concepts of judicial nullification and judicial supremacy as they relate to judicial review.


1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 675-679 ◽  
Author(s):  
Curtis A. Bradley ◽  
Jack L. Goldsmith

The international law community has heavily criticized the United States’ handling of the Breard case. These criticisms are understandable. Perhaps because of the rush of time, the explanations by the Department of Justice and the Supreme Court for failing to stop Breard’s execution brushed over important issues of domestic and international law. In addition, Virginia’s decision to proceed with the execution, and the federal Government’s decision not to block it, may have reflected insufficient respect for international law and institutions. These decisions may also adversely affect U.S. relations with other nations and weaken consular protection of U.S. citizens abroad. These criticisms, however, tell only part of the story. In particular, they do not consider countervailing considerations grounded in the Constitution’s allocation of authority between the federal and state governments.


1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (3) ◽  
pp. 546-550 ◽  
Author(s):  
Detlev F. Vagts

In his concurring opinion in the recent tax treaty case United States v. Stuart, Justice Scalia reports that “I have been unable to discover a single case in which this Court has consulted the Senate debate, committee hearings or committee reports” to interpret a treaty. Even more sweepingly, he says that two 1988 opinions in a district court are the “first (and, as far as I am aware, the only) federal decisions relying upon pre-ratification Senate materials for the interpretation of a treaty.” He moves from there to conclude that the “Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §314, Comment d (1986); id., §325, Reporter’s [sic] Note 5 … must be regarded as a proposal for change rather than a restatement of existing doctrine.” Those are the paragraphs in which the Restatement approves the use of such materials.


1978 ◽  
Vol 72 (3) ◽  
pp. 925-940 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert K. Faulkner

Alexander Bickel's three most comprehensive books explore a common constitutional-political theme, the manner in which sound political judgment should guide judges and scholars who authoritatively interpret the United States Constitution. Yet the works differ, and the differences illuminate a dual development of Bickel's understanding: a growing fear of the contemporary obstacles to politic constitutional judgment, and a growing thoughtfulness in coming to grips with these obstacles. The Least Dangerous Branch had invented politic techniques for applying the judiciary's principles. The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress cautioned against judicial application, by novel techniques, of an impolitic egalitarian faith. The Morality of Consent, upon which this paper concentrates, elaborates Bickel's turn from the techniques of judicial power to the wise direction of judicial power. The paper considers the direction that Bickel proposes.


1988 ◽  
Vol 43 (12) ◽  
pp. 1019-1028 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald N. Bersoff ◽  
Laurel P. Malson ◽  
Donald B. Verrilli

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