J. C. C. McKinsey. Systems of modal logic which are not unreasonable in the sense of Halldén. The journal of symbolic logic, vol. 18 (1953), pp. 109–113.

1954 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-68
Author(s):  
Naoto Yonemitsu
Keyword(s):  
1938 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. West Churchman

In Oskar Becker's Zur Logik der Modalitäten four systems of modal logic are considered. Two of these are mentioned in Appendix II of Lewis and Langford's Symbolic logic. The first system is based on A1–8 plus the postulate,From A7: ∼◊p⊰∼p we can prove the converse of C11 by writing ∼◊p for p, and hence deriveThe addition of this postulate to A1–8, as Becker points out, allows us to “reduce” all complex modal functions to six, and these six are precisely those which Lewis mentions in his postulates and theorems: p, ∼p, ◊p, ∼◊p, ∼◊∼p, and ◊∼p This reduction is accomplished by showingwhere ◊n means that the modal operator ◊ is repeated n times; e.g., ◊3p = ◊◊◊p. Then it is shown thatBy means of (1), (2), and (3) any complex modal function whatsoever may be reduced to one of the six “simple” modals mentioned above.It might be asked whether this reduction could be carried out still further, i.e., whether two of the six “irreducible” modals could not be equated. But such a reduction would have to be based on the fact that ◊p = p which is inconsistent with the set B1–9 of Lewis and Langford's Symbolic logic and independent of the set A1–8. Hence for neither set would such a reduction be possible.


Author(s):  
Ihor Ohirko ◽  
Zinovii Partyko

The problem of the truth of statements is considered. This study had the goal to develop a logical theory that would allow considering the context (the paradigm) from which would depend on the truth of the statement. For the development of such a theory, called the logic of relativity, the following methods of research are used as abstraction, analysis (traditional), synthesis, deduction, formalisation, axiomatisation, logical method. In order to develop the logic of relativity, it is expedient to use the achievements in the area of situational logic. Under the situation, it is proposed to understand two circumstances (time and space) and a condition that creates a context (paradigm) statement. Specifies the modal values that these three parameters can acquire and examines different types of situations. In order to write statements in the logic of relativity, a form of the statement of statements is proposed in the language of extended symbolic logic. For the theory of the logic of relativity, a set of four axioms is proposed and a series of laws. In particular, it is indicated that the values of the assertions in the logic of relativity are the following five estimates: truth, relative truth, relative is absurd, unclear, uncertain. Some theorems of the logic of relativity are proposed. A number of examples of texts in the natural language are given to interpret the statements of the logic of relativity. It is indicated that the proposed apparatus of the logic of relativity should be regarded as a kind of modal logic. The difference in the logic of relativity from situational logic is that it considers the factor of movement (motion) of statements in time, space and environment conditions, which was not considered by situational logic. The logic of relativity should be used wherever it is necessary to take into account the possibility of moving allegations regarding time, space and environment of conditions. One of the most important conclusions of the study is that in the logic to the standard values of truth (true, probably true, false, uncertain), it is expedient to add another value: relatively true (and accordingly: relatively false).


2008 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 393-393

Steve Awodey and Kohei Kishida (2008). Topology and Modality: The Topological Interpretation of First-Order Modal Logic. The Review of Symbolic Logic 1(2): 146-166.On page 148 of this article an error was introduced during the production process. The final equation in the displayed formula 8 lines from the bottom of the page should read,[0, 1) ≠ [0, 1]The publisher regrets this error.


1983 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 488-495 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. A. Bull

2016 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Redding

AbstractIn the 1930s, C. I. Lewis, who was responsible for the revival of modal logic in the era of modern symbolic logic, characterized ‘intensional’ approaches to logic as typical of post-Leibnizian ‘continental philosophy’, in contrast to the ‘extensionalist’ approaches dominant in the British tradition. Indeed Lewis’s own work in this area had been inspired by the logic of his teacher, the American ‘Absolute Idealist’, Josiah Royce. Hegel’s ‘Subjective Logic’ in Book III of hisScience of Logic, can, I suggest, be considered as an intensional modal logic, and this paper explores parallels between it and a later variety of modal logic—tenselogic, as developed by Arthur Prior in the 1950s and 60s. Like Lewis, Prior too had been influenced in this area by a teacher with strong Hegelian leanings—John N. Findlay. Treated as anintensional(with an ‘s’) logic, Hegel’s subjective logic can be used as a framework for addressing issues ofintentionality(with a ‘t’)—the mind’s capacity to be intentionally directed to objects. In this way, I suggest that the structures of his subjective logic can clarify what is at issue in the ‘Psychology’ section of theEncyclopaediaPhilosophy of Subjective Spirit.


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