Herbert A. Simon. The logic of rational decision. The British journal for the philosophy of science, vol. 16 no. 63 (1965), pp. 169–186. - Herbert A. Simon. The logic of heuristic decision making. The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 1–20. - Robert Binkley. Comments on H. Simon's “The logic of heuristic decision making.”The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 21–26. - Nuel D. Belnap Jr. Comments on H. Simon's “The logic of heuristic decision making.”The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 27–31. - Herbert A. Simon. Reply to comments. The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 32–35. - Nicholas Rescher. Semantic foundations for the logic of preference. The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 37–62. - Alan Ross Anderson. Comments on N. Rescher's “Semantic foundations for the logic of preference.”The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 63–70. - Robert Ackermann. Comments on N. Rescher's “Semantic foundations for the logic of preference.”The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 71–76. - Nicholas Rescher. Reply to comments. The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 77–79. - Donald Davidson. The logical form of action sentences. The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 81–95. - E. J. Lemmon. Comments on D. Davidson's “The logical form of action sentences.”The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 96–103. - Hector-Neri Castañeda. Comments on D. Davidson's “The logical form of action sentences.”The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 104–112. - Roderick M. Chisholm. Comments on D. Davidson's “The logical form of action sentences.”The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 113–114. - Donald Davidson. Reply to comments. The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 115–120. - Georg Henrik von Wright. The logic of action—a sketch. The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 121–136. - Roderick M. Chisholm. Comments on von Wright's “The logic of action.”The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 137–139. - John Robison. Comments on von Wright's “The logic of action.”The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 140–143. - Georg Henrik von Wright. Reply to comments. The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 144–146. - Alan Ross Anderson. Appendix I. The formal analysis of normative systems. The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 147–213. - Nicholas Rescher. Appendix II. Aspects of action. The logic of decision and action, edited by Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh1967, pp. 215–219.

1973 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-144
Author(s):  
Edward E. Dawson
2021 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
pp. 15-21
Author(s):  
Rahul Bhui ◽  
Lucy Lai ◽  
Samuel J Gershman

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fritz Breithaupt

This article examines the relation of empathy and rational judgment. When people observe a conflict most are quick to side with one of the parties. Once a side has been taken, empathy with that party further solidifies this choice. Hence, it will be suggested that empathy is not neutral to judgment and rational decision-making. This does not mean, however, that the one who empathizes will necessarily have made the best choice.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arif Ahmed

Evidential Decision Theory is a radical theory of rational decision-making. It recommends that instead of thinking about what your decisions *cause*, you should think about what they *reveal*. This Element explains in simple terms why thinking in this way makes a big difference, and argues that doing so makes for *better* decisions. An appendix gives an intuitive explanation of the measure-theoretic foundations of Evidential Decision Theory.


Author(s):  
Michael R. Gottfredson ◽  
Don M. Gottfredson

Elements ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca Moretti

Policy and intelligence are intimately intertwined. Policymakers need intelligence to make decisions, while the intelligence community derives significance from its ability to provide policy makers with reliable information. In this symbiotic relationship, it is healthy for intelligence consumers to at times check and direct the work of intelligence producers. However, if undertaken maliciously, this checking mechanism manifests as top-down politicization. Here, leaders use intelligence post facto to legitimize their policies instead of using it to guide them, reversing the rational decision-making process. Certain factors may compel leaders to manipulate intelligence to reflect their policy preferences. This essay demonstrates how three distinct processes of top-down politicization can arise from ambiguous evidence, the psychology of intelligence consumers, and the nature of the leaders’ political positions and responsibilities. It then proceeds to argue that political leaders’ psychology is the most potent source of top-down politicization.


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