Moral Realism and the Problem of Moral Aliens

In this paper, I discuss a new problem for moral realism, the problem of moral aliens. In the first section, I introduce this problem. Moral aliens are people who radically disagree with us concerning moral matters. Moral aliens are neither obviously incoherent nor do they seem to lack rational support from their own perspective. On the one hand, moral realists claim that we should stick to our guns when we encounter moral aliens. On the other hand, moral realists, in contrast to anti-realists, seem to be committed to an epistemic symmetry between us and our moral aliens that forces us into rational suspension of our moral beliefs. Unless one disputes the very possibility of moral aliens, this poses a severe challenge to the moral realist. In the second section, I will address this problem. It will turn out that, on closer scrutiny, we cannot make any sense of the idea that moral aliens should be taken as our epistemic peers. Consequently, there is no way to argue that encountering moral aliens gives us any reason to revise our moral beliefs. If my argument is correct, the possibility of encountering moral aliens poses no real threat to moral realism.

ANALISA KONSEP UNIVERSALITAS NILAI ISLAM DAN PANCASILA (STUDI PEMIKIRAN YUDI LATIF)

This article discusses the analysis of the universality concept of Islamic Values and Pancasila in yudi latif's discussion contained in his works. The successor to the Pancasila pride, was able to actualize Pancasila with historical and rational support, by not forgetting the religious, social, cultural and political values in the ideology of Pancasila. The concept of yudi latif in the presentation of his thoughts is able to bring precepts in Pancasila using Indonesian specialties, by providing historical space in the narrative that supports and does not eliminate religiosity, diversity, consultative democracy and social justice. The concept of universality in the values of Islam and Pancasila is expected to be able to dismiss the narratives of radicalism, islamophobia which is developed rapidly developed. This latif thought, is able to provide ontological, epistemological, and axiological understanding between Islam and Pancasila as we.ll as the two things that interrelated to one another. Keywords : Yudi Latif; Analysis; Universality; Islamic Value; Pancasila Value Artikel ini membahas tentang analisa konsep universalitas Nilai Islam dan Pancasila dalam pemikiran Yudi Latif yang termaktub dalam karya-karyanya. Bapak penerus marwah Pancasila ini, mampu megaktualisasikan Pancasila dengan pendekatan historis dan rasional, dengan tidak melupakan nilai agama, sosial, budaya dan politik dalam pengalian ideologi Pancasila. Konsep yudi latif dalam penyajian pemikirannya mampu membawa sila per sila dalam Pancasila kedalam khasanah khas keindonesiaan, dengan memberikan ruang sejarah dalam narasi pemikirannya serta tidak melupakan unsur religiusitas, sebagaimana dalam pembahasan penulis bahwa nilai islam dan nilai Pancasila terkandung dalam Ketauhidan, Kemanusiaan Universal, Persatuan dalam Keragaman, Demokrasi Permusyawaratan serta Keadilan Sosial. Konsep universalitas nilai islam dan Pancasila diharapkan mampu menepis narasi-narasi radikalisme, islamophobia yang marak berkembang belakangan ini. Pemikiran yudi latif secara aktual, mampu memberikan integrasi pemahaman antara islam dan Pancasila secara ontologis, epistemologis, dan aksiologis merupakan dua hal yang saling terhubung satu sama lainnya. Kata Kunci : Yudi Latif; Analisa; Universalitas; Nilai Islam; Nilai Pancasila

A computational framework for understanding the roles of simplicity and rational support in people's behavior explanations

When explaining other people's behavior, people generally find some explanations more satisfying than others. We propose that people judge behavior explanations based on two computational principles: simplicity and rational support -- the extent to which an explanation makes the behavior "make sense" under the assumption that the person is a rational agent. Furthermore, we present a computational framework based on decision networks that can formalize both of these principles. We tested this account in a series of experiments in which subjects rated or generated explanations for other people's behavior. In Experiments 1 and 2, the explanations varied in what the other person liked and disliked. In Experiment 3, the explanations varied in what the other person knew or believed. Results from Experiments 1 and 2 supported the idea that people rely on both simplicity and rational support. However, Experiment 3 suggested that subjects relied only on rational support when judging explanations of people's behavior that varied in what someone knew.

Pragmatism and Semantic Particularism

Pragmatist views inspired by Peirce characterize the content of claims in terms of their practical consequences. The content of a claim is, on these views, determined by what actions are rationally recommended or supported by that claim. In this paper I examine the defeasibility of these relations of rational support. I will argue that such defeasibility introduces a particularist, occasion-sensitive dimension in pragmatist theories of content. More precisely, my conclusion will be that, in the sort of framework naturally derived from Peirce’s pragmatist maxim, grasping conceptual contents is not merely a question of mastering general rules or principles codifying the practical import of claims, but decisively involves being sensitive to surrounding features of the particular situation at hand.

Introduction

This introductory chapter argues that integrating epistemological disjunctivism with Wittgenstein's radical account of the structure of rational evaluation can solve the problem of radical skepticism. On the face of it, these proposals look very different; indeed, they look antithetical and competing. Whereas the one proposal emphasizes the locality of rational evaluation, and hence rational support, the other emphasizes the strength of the rational support available to us in paradigm conditions, in that it is factive. But these differences are superficial, the chapter asserts. In fact, these proposals work very well with each other, in that they are not only compatible, but also mutually supporting and philosophically in the same spirit.

KNOWING WHAT'S NOT UP THE ROAD BY SEEING WHAT'S RIGHT IN FRONT OF YOU: EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM'S FAKE BARN PROBLEM

ABSTRACTEpistemological Disjunctivism (ED) is the view that rational support for paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge that P comes from seeing that P – a state that is both factive and reflectively accessible. ED has the consequence that if I see that there is a barn before me, I can thereby be in a position to know that I am not in fake barn country. It is argued that this is a problem. The problem is distinct from familiar complaints about Neo-Mooreanism and easy knowledge. Potential ways of avoiding this problem are proposed. It is argued that they do not succeed. There is a way out of ED's fake barn problem but many will likely find it inhospitable.

INCOMMENSURABILITY, RELATIVISM, AND THE EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY OF SCIENCE

Our rational inquiries necessarily take place within conceptual and epistemic frameworks, including our rational inquiries into the frameworks themselves. This fact, together with the existence of incommensurable frameworks, is exploited by a Kuhnian argument for conceptual and epistemic relativism which can be used to threaten the epistemic authority of science. It will be argued, however, that this move can be blocked by means of dialectical arguments that provide non-circular rational support for scientific frameworks, both conceptual and epistemic. These arguments proceed by means of conceptual and methodological analyses that reveal the presuppositions that are shared by those who subscribe to incommensurable frameworks. The frameworks that are better able to capture these presuppositions are objectively better than their competitors, and it will be argued that the conceptual and epistemic frameworks of science have precisely this advantage.