A logical presentation of the continuous functionals

1997 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 1021-1034
Author(s):  
Erik Palmgren ◽  
Viggo Stoltenberg-Hansen

The Kleene-Kreisel continuous functionals [6, 7] have been given several alternative characterisations: using Kuratowski's limit spaces (Scarpellini [20]), using their generalisation, filter spaces (Hyland [4]), via hyperfinite functionals (Normann [11]) and perhaps most elegantly using Scott-Ershov domains (Ershov [3], later generalised by Berger [1]). We propose to add yet another characterisation to this list, which may be called model-theoretic in contrast to the others, but which is in fact closely related to Ershov's approach.We use the notion of logically presented domains developed in Palmgren and Stoltenberg-Hansen [17] (originating in the work of [15]). Certain logical types, i.e., finitely consistent sets of formulas, over the full type structure built from ℕ correspond to the continuous functionals in the sense of Kreisel, or to Kleene's associates, while the elements realising the types correspond to functionals having associates (cf. [6]). To define these—the total types—we make a nonstandard extension of the full type structure. The set of nonstandard elements is sufficiently rich to single out the total types. The nonstandard extension also makes it possible to relate the logical presentation to Ershov's approach. The logical form of the domain constructions allows us to use a (generalised) Fréchet power as a nonstandard extension. This extension is constructive, in the sense that it avoids the axiom of choice, as distinguished from the one employed in [11].

1998 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 600-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Berardi ◽  
Marc Bezem ◽  
Thierry Coquand

AbstractWe present a possible computational content of the negative translation of classical analysis with the Axiom of (countable) Choice. Interestingly, this interpretation uses a refinement of the realizability semantics of the absurdity proposition, which is not interpreted as the empty type here. We also show how to compute witnesses from proofs in classical analysis of ∃-statements and how to extract algorithms from proofs of ∀∃-statements. Our interpretation seems computationally more direct than the one based on Gödel's Dialectica interpretation.


1955 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 140-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Montague

Mr. Shen Yuting, in this Journal, vol. 18, no. 2 (June, 1953), stated a new paradox of intuitive set-theory. This paradox involves what Mr. Yuting calls the class of all grounded classes, that is, the family of all classes a for which there is no infinite sequence b such that … ϵ bn ϵ … ϵ b2ϵb1 ϵ a.Now it is possible to state this paradox without employing any complex set-theoretical notions (like those of a natural number or an infinite sequence). For let a class x be called regular if and only if (k)(x ϵ k ⊃ (∃y)(y ϵ k · ~(∃z)(z ϵ k · z ϵ y))). Let Reg be the class of all regular classes. I shall show that Reg is neither regular nor non-regular.Suppose, on the one hand, that Reg is regular. Then Reg ϵ Reg. Now Reg ϵ ẑ(z = Reg). Therefore, since Reg is regular, there is a y such that y ϵ ẑ(z = Reg) · ~(∃z)(z ϵ z(z = Reg) · z ϵ y). Hence ~(∃z)(z ϵ ẑ(z = Reg) · z ϵ Reg). But there is a z (namely Reg) such that z ϵ ẑ(z = Reg) · z ϵ Reg.On the other hand, suppose that Reg is not regular. Then, for some k, Reg ϵ k · [1] (y)(y ϵ k ⊃ (∃z)(z ϵ k · z ϵ y)). It follows that, for some z, z ϵ k · z ϵ Reg. But this implies that (ϵy)(y ϵ k · ~(ϵw)(w ϵ k · w ϵ y)), which contradicts [1].It can easily be shown, with the aid of the axiom of choice, that the regular classes are just Mr. Yuting's grounded classes.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vasil Dinev Penchev

The link between the high-order metaphysics and abstractions, on the one hand, and choice in the foundation of set theory, on the other hand, can distinguish unambiguously the “good” principles of abstraction from the “bad” ones and thus resolve the “bad company problem” as to set theory. Thus it implies correspondingly a more precise definition of the relation between the axiom of choice and “all company” of axioms in set theory concerning directly or indirectly abstraction: the principle of abstraction, axiom of comprehension, axiom scheme of specification, axiom scheme of separation, subset axiom scheme, axiom scheme of replacement, axiom of unrestricted comprehension, axiom of extensionality, etc.


Author(s):  
Alexander R. Pruss

This is a mainly technical chapter concerning the causal embodiment of the Axiom of Choice from set theory. The Axiom of Choice powered a construction of an infinite fair lottery in Chapter 4 and a die-rolling strategy in Chapter 5. For those applications to work, there has to be a causally implementable (though perhaps not compatible with our laws of nature) way to implement the Axiom of Choice—and, for our purposes, it is ideal if that involves infinite causal histories, so the causal finitist can reject it. Such a construction is offered. Moreover, other paradoxes involving the Axiom of Choice are given, including two Dutch Book paradoxes connected with the Banach–Tarski paradox. Again, all this is argued to provide evidence for causal finitism.


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