Female Labour Supply and Marital Status Decisions: A Life-Cycle Model

1996 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wilbert Van Der Klaauw
Keyword(s):  
Life Cycle ◽  
Marital Status ◽  
Labour Supply ◽  
Life Cycle Model ◽  
Cycle Model ◽  
Female Labour Supply ◽  
Female Labour

Corrigendum on A Life Cycle Model of Female Labour Supply

1982 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 659 ◽  
Author(s):  
James J. Heckman ◽  
Thomas MaCurdy
Keyword(s):  
Life Cycle ◽  
Labour Supply ◽  
Life Cycle Model ◽  
Cycle Model ◽  
Female Labour Supply ◽  
Female Labour

A Life Cycle Model of Female Labour Supply

1980 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 47 ◽  
Author(s):  
James J. Heckman ◽  
Thomas E. Macurdy
Keyword(s):  
Life Cycle ◽  
Labour Supply ◽  
Life Cycle Model ◽  
Cycle Model ◽  
Female Labour Supply ◽  
Female Labour

scholarly journals It Sucks to Be Single! Marital Status and Redistribution of Social Security*

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Groneck ◽  
Johanna Wallenius
Keyword(s):  
Life Cycle ◽  
Life Expectancy ◽  
Social Security ◽  
Marital Status ◽  
Labour Supply ◽  
Life Cycle Model ◽  
Depressing Effect ◽  
Cycle Model ◽  
Marriage Stability ◽  
The Us

Abstract In this article, we study the labour supply effects and the redistributional consequences of the US social security system. We focus particularly on auxiliary benefits, where eligibility is linked to marital status. To this end, we develop a dynamic, structural life cycle model of singles and couples, featuring uncertain marital status and survival. We account for the socio-economic gradients to both marriage stability and life expectancy. We find that auxiliary benefits have a large depressing effect on married women’s employment. Moreover, we show that a revenue neutral minimum benefit scheme would moderately reduce inequality relative to the current US system.

Female labour supply over the life-cycle

1998 ◽  
Vol 5 (9) ◽  
pp. 569-572
Author(s):  
Pedro Duarte Neves
Keyword(s):  
Life Cycle ◽  
Labour Supply ◽  
Female Labour Supply ◽  
Female Labour

Free to Leave? A Welfare Analysis of Divorce Regimes

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 72-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raquel Fernández ◽  
Joyce Cheng Wong
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Life Cycle ◽  
Marital Status ◽  
Welfare Analysis ◽  
The United States ◽  
Life Cycle Model ◽  
Cycle Model ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Unilateral Divorce ◽  
Consumption Saving

During the 1970s, the United States switched from mutual consent to a unilateral divorce regime. Who benefited/lost from this change? We develop a dynamic life cycle model in which agents make consumption, saving, work, and marital-status decisions under a given divorce regime. Calibrating the model to match key moments for the 1940 cohort and conditioning solely on gender, our ex ante welfare analysis finds that women fare better under mutual consent whereas men prefer a unilateral system. Conditioning as well on initial productivity (expected income), we find that the top three quintiles of men and the top two quintiles of women prefer unilateral divorce. (JEL D91, J12, J16, K36)

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