The “Veepstakes”: Strategic Choice in Presidential Running Mate Selection

1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (4) ◽  
pp. 855-864 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee Sigelman ◽  
Paul J. Wahlbeck

We examine the presidential nominees' choice of running mate in each election since 1940, when Franklin Roosevelt established a precedent by naming his own. To analyze the 22 choices made from the pool of 127 serious possibilities, we employ a discrete choice model. We find that the presidential nominee's choice is explained primarily by the size of the prospective vice president's state, by whether the running mate finalist was a rival for the nomination, and by the balance in age for the ticket.

2021 ◽  
Vol 184 ◽  
pp. 172-177
Author(s):  
Guoxi Feng ◽  
Maxime Jean ◽  
Alexandre Chasse ◽  
Sebastian Hörl

2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrés Mideros ◽  
Cathal O’Donoghue

AbstractWe examine the effect of unconditional cash transfers by a unitary discrete labour supply model. We argue that there is no negative income effect of social transfers in the case of poor adults because leisure could not be assumed to be a normal good under such conditions. Using data from the national employment survey of Ecuador (ENEMDUR) we estimate the effect of the


2004 ◽  
Vol 1898 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kazuaki Miyamoto ◽  
Varameth Vichiensan ◽  
Naoki Shimomura ◽  
Antonio Páez

1996 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hideo Konishi ◽  
Peter Fishburn

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