Courts, Parties, and Campaign Finance

2021 ◽  
pp. 173-206
Keyword(s):  
2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Necmi Avkiran ◽  
Direnn Kanol ◽  
Barry R. Oliver
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
MARTIN GILENS ◽  
SHAWN PATTERSON ◽  
PAVIELLE HAINES

Abstract Despite a century of efforts to constrain money in American elections, there is little consensus on whether campaign finance regulations make any appreciable difference. Here we take advantage of a change in the campaign finance regulations of half of the U.S. states mandated by the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision. This exogenously imposed change in the regulation of independent expenditures provides an advance over the identification strategies used in most previous studies. Using a generalized synthetic control method, we find that after Citizens United, states that had previously banned independent corporate expenditures (and thus were “treated” by the decision) adopted more “corporate-friendly” policies on issues with broad effects on corporations’ welfare; we find no evidence of shifts on policies with little or no effect on corporate welfare. We conclude that even relatively narrow changes in campaign finance regulations can have a substantively meaningful influence on government policy making.


Author(s):  
Jeffrey M. Berry

The relationships between interest groups, political parties, and elections have always been dynamic, but in recent years change has accelerated in ways that have favored some interests over others. This chapter considers these developments as the result of a variety of factors, the most critical of which are the growth of polarization, a new legal landscape for campaign finance, and new organizational forms. The chapter goes on to suggest, that as bipartisanship has ebbed, elections have become winner-take-all affairs and interest groups are pushed to choose sides. The chapter further suggests that the rise of super PACs is especially notable as wealthy individuals have become increasingly important, single sources of campaign money, supplanting in part traditional interest groups, especially conventional PACs. It concludes that even as sums spent by super PACs and other interest groups have skyrocketed, the impact of their direct spending on persuading voters remains uncertain.


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