Molinism, Question-Begging, and Foreknowledge of Indeterminates

Abstract John Martin Fischer’s charge that Molinism does not offer a unique answer to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human freedom can be seen as a criticism of middle knowledge for begging the question of FF (foreknowledge and freedom)-compatibilism. In this paper, I seek to answer this criticism in two ways. First, I demonstrate that most of the chief arguments against middle knowledge are guilty of begging the question of FF-incompatibilism and conclude that the simple charge of begging the question cannot be as problematic as some suggest. Determinists and open theists incorporate FF-incompatibilist notions into their respective versions of the grounding objection, their conceptions of risk and libertarian freedom, and their requirements for divine foreknowledge. Thus, while I admit that Molinism does rely upon Ockhamist and Augustinian principles in its approach to the dilemma and is guilty of presupposing FF-compatibilism, I deny that this undermines its strength as a model of providence. Second, I argue that, although all models are guilty of question-begging moves, they are not all on par with one another. Molinism offers a more orthodox and robust approach to providence than open theism and process theology, and it handles empirical data (e.g., from science) better than all of its competitors.

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Molinist Gunslingers Redux: A Friendly Response to Greg Welty

Perichoresis ◽

10.2478/perc-2018-0009 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 16 (2) ◽

pp. 31-44

Author(s):

Kenneth D. Keathley

Keyword(s):

Problem Of Evil ◽

Human Freedom ◽

Causal Determinism ◽

Middle Knowledge ◽

The Problem Of Evil ◽

Libertarian Freedom ◽

Better Than

Abstract Philosopher Greg Welty contributed a chapter entitled ‘Molinist Gunslingers: God and the Authorship of Sin’, to a book devoted to answering the charge that Calvinism makes God the author of sin (Calvinism and the Problem of Evil). Welty argues that Molinism has the same problems as Calvinism concerning God’s relationship to sin, regardless of what view of human freedom Molinism may affirm. The Molinist believes that God generally uses his knowledge of the possible choices of libertarianly free creatures in order to accomplish his will. (This knowledge is typically categorized as residing within God’s middle knowledge.) But affirming libertarian freedom for humans, he argues, does not help in dealing with the question of God’s relationship to evil. Therefore, Molinism is no better than Calvinism, at least concerning this issue. In response to Welty, (1) I agree with him that Molinism does not have a moral advantage over what he calls ‘mysterian, apophatic’ Calvinism, but Molinists don’t claim that it does, and (2) I argue that, contra Welty, Molinism indeed does have a moral advantage over the Calvinist versions that do employ causal determinism. Welty does not take ‘intentions’ into consideration in his argument, and this is a serious flaw. In the libertarian model of Molinism, intent originates in the doer of evil. However, in the compatibilist model of causal determinism, ultimately God implants intent. Thus, adherents of causal determinism have difficulty not laying responsibility at the feet of God.

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Universalism for open theists

Religious Studies ◽

10.1017/s0034412506008298 ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 42 (2) ◽

pp. 213-223 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

GORDON KNIGHT

Keyword(s):

Human Freedom ◽

Open Theism ◽

Traditional Concept ◽

Middle Knowledge

In this paper I argue that the denial of middle knowledge and emphasis on human freedom characteristic of open theism makes the traditional concept of hell even more morally problematic than it would otherwise be. But these same features of open theism present serious difficulties for the view that all will necessarily be saved. I conclude by arguing that the most promising approach for open theists is to adopt a version of contingent, as opposed to necessary, universalism.

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Divine Foreknowledge and Providence

TheoLogica An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology ◽

10.14428/thl.v4i3.55003 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 4 (3) ◽

Author(s):

Aldro Frigerio ◽

Ciro De Florio

Keyword(s):

Human Freedom ◽

Divine Providence ◽

Open Theism ◽

Trade Off ◽

Divine Foreknowledge ◽

The World ◽

Human Autonomy ◽

History Of ◽

Pros And Cons

In this paper, we aim to examine the relationships between four solutions to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human freedom—theological determinism, Molinism, simple foreknowledge and open theism—and divine providence and theodicy. Some of these solutions—theological determinism and Molinism, in particular—highlight God’s government of the world. Some others—simple foreknowledge and open theism—highlight human autonomy and freedom. In general, the more libertarian human freedom is highlighted, the less God’s government of the history of the world seems possible. However, the task of theodicy becomes easier because humans are fully responsible for the evil they do. Conversely, the more God’s government is highlighted, the more human freedom seems to be restricted. Moreover, God seems to be directly or indirectly responsible for evil in the world. Because of the trade–off between control and freedom, each solution finds itself at ease with some problems, while on other fronts, it must adopt a defensive position. As we will see, no solution can solve all problems; thus, the pros and cons of each solution should be weighed carefully.

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Providence and Evil: Three Theories

Religious Studies ◽

10.1017/s0034412500021405 ◽

1992 ◽

Vol 28 (1) ◽

pp. 91-105 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

William Hasker

Keyword(s):

Free Will ◽

Human Freedom ◽

Metaphysical Possibility ◽

Philosophical Work ◽

Divine Foreknowledge ◽

Middle Knowledge

The last two decades have seen an unprecedented amount of philosophical work on the topics of divine foreknowledge, middle knowledge, and timelessness in relation to human freedom. Most of this effort has been directed at logical and metaphysical aspects of these topics – the compatibility of foreknowledge with free will, the existence of true counterfactuals of freedom and the possibility of middle knowledge, the conceivability and metaphysical possibility of divine timelessness, and so on. Far less attention, in contrast, has been devoted to the broader theological ramifications of these theories. Yet insofar as they are theological theories, they are properly appreciated and indeed fully understood only when placed in the appropriate theological context.

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