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2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Masayuki Iwase ◽  
Joff P. N. Bradley

Abstract The authors explore the noncompliant pedagogy of the image based on their video Autopoietic Veering: Schizo Socius of Tokyo and Vancouver (2021). It is not the kind of trendy modelized video abstract or kinetic presentation eagerly promoted by international publishers; it is a cross-cultural collaborative work intended to generate affirmative temporal ruptures of entropic habitual modes of seeing, memorizing, and thinking of human and nonhuman life in the cities of Tokyo (Japan) and Vancouver (Canada). The authors elucidate Stiegler’s (2015b) concept of a “global mnemotechnical system” that stores and produces human memories in vast digital archives and databases (tertiary retentions) through “mnemonic control” (Parisi & Goodman, 2011). The authors repurpose video images to interrupt and recontrol human perception and memories as “living engines” (Lazzarato, 2006). They foreground the philosophical work of Deleuze, Heidegger, and Virilio to rethink and revive the creative act of “critique” (Foucault, 1997) through “metamodelization” (Guattari, 1995; Manning, 2020); therefore, they plug these apparently incommensurable modes of thinking into their readings of the video’s images. They read the images as “time-images” and focus on their five dimensions that possibly activate “spiritual automation” (Deleuze, 1989), which they assess as “negentropic bifurcatory” potentials (Bradley & Kennedy, 2019).


2021 ◽  
pp. 096777201985823
Author(s):  
Charles T Ambrose

In 1940 during the early phase of the Nazi aerial assault on Britain, the English neurophysiologist, C.S. Sherrington, age 83 years, had just published a philosophical work, Man on His Nature, and was researching the writings of Jean Fernel, a 16th century French physician . Sherrington’s study of Fernel stemmed from a common interest they shared in the association between the mind and the brain. This essay was prompted by a short letter penned by Sherrington in December 1940 and bound years later in his biography, The Endeavour of Jean Fernel, published in 1946. The letter requested information about a particular medical work by Fernel but also mentioned in passing Sherrington’s recent forced evacuation from his home in Ipswich, threatened by German bombing and invasion. The letter in the book invited a reprise of his remarkable career and a study of his last neurological concern – the mind–brain mystery.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 287-305
Author(s):  
Debora Spini

The essay explores the work of Elena Pulcini, who was snatched away by the pandemic when her ideas and her work were becoming more and more visible in the public sphere. Books like Care of the World, or her last work Tra cura e giustizia, were read and discussed beyond the usual academic circles. Although she was profoundly alien from spectacularisation of any kind, in the last years her profile had become that of a public intellectual whose philosophical work was a point of reference for a wide variety of groups and networks, from feminists to environmentalists.


This volume provides a forum for some of the best new philosophical work on law, by both senior and junior scholars from around the world. The chapters range widely over issues in general jurisprudence (the nature of law, adjudication, and legal reasoning); the philosophical foundations of specific areas of law (from criminal law to evidence to international law); the history of legal philosophy; and related philosophical topics that illuminate the problems of legal theory.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joffrey Fuhrer ◽  
Florian Cova ◽  
Nicolas Gauvrit ◽  
Sebastian Dieguez

Some people publicly pretend to be experts while not being ones. They are pseudoexperts, and their presence seems to be ubiquitous in the current cultural landscape. This manuscript explores the nature and mechanisms of pseudoexpertise. We first provide a conceptual analysis of pseudoexperts based on prototypical cases of pseudoexpertise and recent philosophical work on the concept of expertise. This allows us to propose a definition that captures real-world cases of pseudoexpertise, distinguishes it from related but different concepts such as pseudoscience, and highlights what is wrong with pseudoexpertise. Next, based on this conceptual analysis, we propose a framework for further research on pseudoexpertise, built on relevant empirical and theoretical approaches to cultural cognition. We provide exploratory answers to three questions: why is there pseudoexpertise at all; how can pseudoexperts be successful despite not being experts; and what becomes of pseudoexperts in the long run. Together, these conceptual and theoretical approaches to pseudoexpertise draw a preliminary framework from which to approach the very troubling problem posed by persons usurping the capacities and reputations of genuine experts.


Human Affairs ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 479-487
Author(s):  
Elly Vintiadis

Abstract Today the way philosophical work is presented is very narrowly circumscribed and as a result, this excludes people who do not want to, or cannot effectively, present their work in a particular manner. This canonization of the mode of presentation of philosophical work also serves to maintain the status quo of analytic philosophy as an exclusively academic discipline. In this paper I argue that diversity in how philosophical thinking is presented should be allowed, and even, encouraged. I argue that it is in philosophy’s interest to expand the ways that it is presented, because not doing so not only limits who can participate in philosophy, but it also limits who philosophy attracts and so how far-reaching philosophy can be.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Vrahimis

Abstract In his earliest philosophical work, Moritz Schlick developed a proposal for rendering aesthetics into a field of empirical science. His 1908 book Lebensweisheit developed an evolutionary account of the emergence of both scientific knowledge and aesthetic feelings from play. This constitutes the framework of Schlick’s evolutionary psychological methodology for examining the origins of the aesthetic feeling of the beautiful he proposed in 1909. He defends his methodology by objecting to both experimental psychological and Darwinian reductionist accounts of aesthetics. Having countered these approaches, Schlick applies Külpe’s psychological distinction between stimulus-feelings and idea-feelings to collapse the traditional philosophical opposition between the agreeable and the beautiful. Both types of feeling, Schlick argues, result from humans’ adaptation to their environment. Because of this adaptation, feelings that were once only stimuli for action can come to be enjoyed for their own sake. This thesis underlies Schlick’s 1908 argument that art, qua mimesis, is necessarily inferior to aesthetic feelings directed towards the environment. Part of Schlick’s justification for this view is that humans are, through a long evolutionary process, better adapted to their environment than to artworks. Schlick nevertheless concedes that mimetic art can involve ways of abstracting from the objects it copies to produce idealised regularities that are not found in the original. Schlick thus concludes that art teaches its audience how to perceive the world in this abstract and idealised manner. This type of environmental aesthetics constitutes a means for reaching Schlick’s utopian ecological vision of a future in which culture will become harmonised with nature.


Tekstualia ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (65) ◽  
pp. 57-68
Author(s):  
Szymon Grzybowski

The article examines the differences between and the common features of the Polish translations of Analects by Confucius. A comparative analysis of the syntax and the lexis helps to illuminate the strategies used by the translators and to answer the question as to how the approach to translating a philosophical work affects its reception.


Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 754
Author(s):  
W. Scott Cleveland

St. Paul writes, “whatever you do, do everything for the glory of God (1 Corinthians 10: 31 NABRE).” This essay employs the work of St. Thomas Aquinas and the recent philosophical work of Daniel Johnson (2020) on this command to investigate a series of questions that the command raises. What is glory? How does one properly act for glory and for the glory of another? How is it possible to do everything for the glory of God? I begin with Aquinas’ account of glory and the pursuit of glory for God’s glory and Aquinas’s answers to some of the above questions that can be drawn from his discussion in De Malo. I defend Aquinas against criticisms from Daniel Johnson and present his own interpretation of the command. I advance the discussion through adding two additional interpretations that do not rely on a controversial assumption Johnson makes. Next, I address the puzzle of how we can intend everything for the glory of God using Aquinas’s three-fold account of intention. Finally, I discuss the relation between charity and the desire for God’s glory and how regular, actual intentions of one’s actions for the glory of God increases charity.


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