scholarly journals Inference as doxastic agency. Part II: Ramifications and refinements

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 408 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heinrich Wansing ◽  
Grigory K. Olkhovikov

Justification stit logic is a logic for reasoning about proving as a certain kind of activity, namely seeing to it that a proof is publicly available. It merges the semantical analysis of deliberatively seeing-to-it-that from stit theory (Belnap, Perloff, Xu 2001) and the semantics of the epistemic logic with justification from (Artemov and Nogina 2005). In this paper, after recalling its language and basic semantical definitions, various ramifications and refinements of justification stit logic are presented and discussed: imposing natural restrictions upon the class of models under consideration, making use of modalities that assert the existence of a proof, introducing a variant of justification stit logic based on a semantics introduced by M. Fitting, and adding variable-binding operators and extending the set of proof polynomials.

Studia Logica ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 107 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grigory K. Olkhovikov ◽  
Heinrich Wansing
Keyword(s):  

2010 ◽  
Vol 30 (8) ◽  
pp. 2173-2176
Author(s):  
Jian-shu YANG ◽  
Jin-zhao WU ◽  
Jin ZHOU
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (5) ◽  
pp. 671-692
Author(s):  
Grigory K Olkhovikov

Abstract In Part I of this paper we presented a Hilbert-style system $\Sigma _D$ axiomatizing stit logic of justification announcements interpreted over models with discrete time structure. In this part, we prove three frame definability results for $\Sigma _D$ using three different definitions of a frame plus another version of completeness result.


2005 ◽  
Vol 15 (6) ◽  
pp. 1059-1073 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergei Artemov ◽  
Elena Nogina
Keyword(s):  

1983 ◽  
Vol 4 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 63-72
Author(s):  
Newton C.A. da Costa ◽  
Chris Mortensen
Keyword(s):  

2010 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Roy

In this paper I study intentions of the form ‘I intend that we . . .’, that is, intentions with a we-content, and their role in interpersonal coordination. I focus on the notion of epistemic support for such intentions. Using tools from epistemic game theory and epistemic logic, I cast doubt on whether such support guarantees the other agents' conditional mediation in the achievement of such intentions, something that appears important if intentions with a we-content are to count as genuine intentions. I then formulate a stronger version of epistemic support, one that does indeed ensure the required mediation, but I then argue that it rests on excessively strong informational conditions. In view of this I provide an alternative set of conditions that are jointly sufficient for coordination in games, and I argue that these conditions constitute a plausible alternative to the proposed notion of epistemic support.


Author(s):  
Alexandru Baltag ◽  
Aybüke Özgün ◽  
Ana Lucia Vargas Sandoval

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