Prospects for Moral Success Theory

<p>In this thesis, I will argue that the existence of moral facts does not rely on the existence of a reason for action, and that moral facts can be made sense of in other ways. My thesis is both a reply to a type of moral error theory that has been advanced by Richard Joyce and John Mackie, and an account of the truthmakers of moral judgments. The argument for error theory that I respond to is roughly as follows: moral judgments are judgments about external practical reasons. But external reasons do not exist, and so no moral judgment is ever true. In the first part of my thesis, I will argue in favour of the latter premise of the error theorist’s argument, but against the former: external reasons do not exist, but moral judgments are not committed to them. In the second half of my thesis I build up a positive account of what moral judgments involve. If moral judgments are not judgments about reasons, then what are moral judgments about? I develop the widely supported idea that moral judgments are judgments that are based on welfarist considerations, and attempt to give this idea a more precise formulation than what has been previously offered. From this account, I go on to develop an account of the truthmakers of moral judgments. The account I end up with is an ideal observer theory that I believe makes sense of a broad range of intuitions about morality. My hope is that this thesis will be of interest to others who feel the pull of moral error theory, but would prefer to see moral success theory vindicated.</p>

Précis of Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence

Journal of Moral Philosophy ◽

10.1163/17455243-01304001 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 13 (4) ◽

pp. 397-402

Author(s):

Jonas Olson

Keyword(s):

Moral Realism ◽

Error Theory ◽

Moral Judgments ◽

Moral Beliefs ◽

Moral Error Theory ◽

Ontological Question ◽

Moral Error ◽

Contemporary Perspective ◽

Moral error theorists and moral realists agree about several disputed metaethical issues. They typically agree that ordinary moral judgments are beliefs and that ordinary moral utterances purport to refer to moral facts. But they disagree on the crucial ontological question of whether there are any moral facts. Moral error theorists hold that there are not and that, as a consequence, ordinary moral beliefs are systematically mistaken and ordinary moral judgments uniformly untrue. Perhaps because of its kinship with moral realism, moral error theory is often considered the most notorious of moral scepticisms. While the view has been widely discussed, it has had relatively few defenders. Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence (henceforth met) examines the view from a historical as well as a contemporary perspective, and purports to respond to some of its most prominent challenges. This précis is a brief summary of the book’s content.

Morality and Epistemic Judgement

10.1093/oso/9780198842736.001.0001 ◽

2019 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Christopher Cowie

Keyword(s):

Moral Judgment ◽

Error Theory ◽

Moral Judgments ◽

Moral Error Theory ◽

Moral Error ◽

Argument From Analogy

Moral judgments attempt to describe a reality that does not exist. As a consequence those judgments – and those of us who make them – are systematically mistaken. This is the moral error theory. One of the most interesting and important reasons for rejecting it is that its truth would entail a highly implausible error theory of epistemic judgments. These are judgments about what one ought to believe given one’s evidence. This is the argument from analogy. The aim of this book is to systematise and assess it. It is argued that it fails. The analogy between moral judgment and epistemic judgment is misconceived. The moral error theory could yet be true.

On the Defensibility and Believability of Moral Error Theory

Journal of Moral Philosophy ◽

10.1163/17455243-01304005 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 13 (4) ◽

pp. 461-473 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Jonas Olson

Keyword(s):

Moral Realism ◽

Error Theory ◽

Oxford University ◽

Moral Error Theory ◽

Moral Error ◽

Oxford University Press ◽

This article is a response to critical articles by Daan Evers, Bart Streumer, and Teemu Toppinen on my book Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). I will be concerned with four main topics. I shall first try to illuminate the claim that moral facts are queer, and its role in the argument for moral error theory. In section 2, I discuss the relative merits of moral error theory and moral contextualism. In section 3, I explain why I still find the queerness argument concerning supervenience an unpromising argument against non-naturalistic moral realism. In section 4, finally, I reconsider the question whether I, or anyone, can believe the error theory.

Moral and Epistemic Error Theory

Metaepistemology ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198805366.003.0007 ◽

2018 ◽

pp. 107-121 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Jonas Olson

Keyword(s):

Error Theory ◽

Normative Reasons ◽

Moral Reasons ◽

Epistemic Reasons ◽

Moral Error Theory ◽

Moral Error ◽

Epistemic Realism ◽

Companions In Guilt ◽

Many moral error theorists hold that moral facts are irreducibly normative. They also hold that irreducible normativity is metaphysically queer and conclude that there are no irreducibly normative reasons and consequently no moral facts. A popular response to moral error theory utilizes the so-called ‘companions in guilt’ strategy and argues that if moral reasons are irreducibly normative, then epistemic reasons are too. This is the Parity Premise, on the basis of which critics of moral error theory draw the Parity Conclusion that if there are no irreducibly normative reasons, there are no moral reasons and no epistemic reasons. From the Parity Conclusion and Epistemic Realism (the view that there are epistemic reasons), it follows that it is false that there are no irreducibly normative reasons. In this chapter, it is argued that the Parity Premise and the Parity Conclusion can both plausibly be rejected.

Mackie’s Conceptual Reform Moral Error Theory

The Journal of Value Inquiry ◽

10.1007/s10790-018-9646-9 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 53 (2) ◽

pp. 175-191

Author(s):

Wouter Floris Kalf

Keyword(s):

Error Theory ◽

Moral Error Theory ◽

V-Moral Error Theory

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society ◽

10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00083.x ◽

2004 ◽

Vol 104 (1) ◽

pp. 95-111 ◽

Cited By ~ 11

Author(s):

Hallvard Lillehammer

Keyword(s):

Error Theory ◽

Moral Error Theory ◽

In Defense of Moral Error Theory

New Waves in Metaethics ◽

10.1057/9780230294899_4 ◽

2011 ◽

pp. 62-84 ◽

Cited By ~ 14

Author(s):

Jonas Olson

Keyword(s):

Error Theory ◽

Moral Error Theory ◽

Jonas Olson’s Evidence for Moral Error Theory

Journal of Moral Philosophy ◽

10.1163/17455243-01304002 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 13 (4) ◽

pp. 403-418

Author(s):

Daan Evers

Keyword(s):

Error Theory ◽

Not Given ◽

Moral Error Theory ◽

Jonas Olson defends a moral error theory in 2014. I first argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral nonnaturalism in his own opinion. I then argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral contextualism either (although the latter is not a matter of his own opinion). I conclude that Olson has not given us quite enough evidence for moral error theory.

Conclusion

Morality and Epistemic Judgement ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0011 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 213-218

Author(s):

Christopher Cowie

Keyword(s):

Error Theory ◽

Reasons For Action ◽

Reasons For Belief ◽

Moral Error Theory ◽

Moral Error ◽

Epistemic Consequentialism ◽

Argument From Analogy ◽

Moral Properties ◽

Categorical Reasons

The views outlined in earlier chapters are systematically presented. These include: the truth of epistemic institutionalism and falsity of analogous institutionalist views in morality; the challenges facing categorical reasons for action that do not apply to categorial reasons for belief; the reducible nature of epistemic properties and relations—including the defensibility of this view in light of concerns with the normativity of probability and the falsity of both veritism and epistemic consequentialism—in contrast to the irreducible nature of moral properties and relations, and the possibility of ‘the puzzling combination’. It is concluded that the argument from analogy fails and that the moral error theory may yet be true, but that it would be illegitimate to conclude that it is true.