Effect Open Interest on Implied Cost of Equity Capital of Firms Listed Single Stock Futures in the Derivatives Market

2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-154
Author(s):  
Sang-hyuk Lee ◽  
Hong-min Chun
2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Induck Hwang ◽  
Hyungtae Kim ◽  
Sangshin Pae

<p>This study provides evidence on the association between equity-based compensation for outside directors and the implied cost of equity capital. Based on the premise that equity-based compensation for outside directors better aligns the interests of the directors with those of shareholders, we investigate whether the more equity-based compensation is granted to outside directors, the lower cost of equity capital firms enjoy. We find a negative relationship between the proportion of equity-based compensation to total compensation for outside directors and the cost of equity capital. Our findings suggest that equity-based compensation for outside directors, by motivating the directors to play their monitoring role more faithfully, reduces agency risks resulting in the lower cost of equity capital.</p>


2010 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin C. W. Chen ◽  
Zhihong Chen ◽  
K. C. John Wei

AbstractIn this paper, we examine the effect of shareholder rights on reducing the cost of equity and the impact of agency problems from free cash flow (FCF) on this effect. We find that firms with strong shareholder rights have a significantly lower implied cost of equity after controlling for risk factors, price momentum, analysts’ forecast biases, and industry and year effects than do firms with weak shareholder rights. Further analysis shows that the effect of shareholder rights on reducing the cost of equity is significantly stronger for firms with more severe agency problems from FCFs.


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