Balanced Budget Requirements Revisited

We test the effect of balanced budget requirements (BBRs) on budget outcomes using data published in audited financial statements. With a focus on the General Fund, we find states frequently reported deficits in their adopted budgets and relied on sizeable and favorable expenditure variances to close budget gaps before the end of the budget period. Empirical analysis shows that technical or strict BBRs procedures did not increase the likelihood that a state would report a balanced budget. We corroborate our findings using fund balance data. If technical or strict BBRs are effective, states would report higher fund balances, all else equal. Results show that states that adopted political BBRs reported lower fund balances. More importantly, the adoption of strict or technical BBRs did not lead to higher fund balances.

The flypaper sticks even when aid travels overseas

This paper extends the current literature by considering the existence of the flypaper effect internationally, with donor countries supplying foreign aid to recipient countries. The flypaper effect refers to the empirical anomaly associated with intergovernmental grants stimulating government expenditures more than can be explained by a pure income effect. The results reveal evidence of flypaper behavior such that for recipient countries one dollar of foreign aid raises public spending by $0.21-$0.42, whereas an equal increase in domestic income raises government expenditures by only $0.09-$0.16. Furthermore, we exploit variation in political institutions across countries and find that the flypaper effect is most pronounced in less democratic countries and find no flypaper effect in more democratic countries. This suggests that government officials are more likely to behave as expected by the median voter model when they are held accountable. Furthermore, countries with proportional, rather than majority/plurality, voting mechanisms do not display flypaper behavior.

Public Input Provision, Tax Base Mobility, and External Ownership

This article investigates the distortionary impacts of tax base mobility and external ownership on public input provision. Regional governments compete for mobile tax bases (e.g., business capital). The impact of regional public policy partially accrues to non-residents because immobile factors (e.g., business land) are subject to external ownership. This article derives an optimal rule for regional public input provision that illustrates how these two distortionary impacts depend on the nature of production functions. The impact of external ownership is particularly complex. To explore this impact in detail, the case of production functions with constant elasticity of substitution is examined. Public inputs with different productivity impacts yield fairly different implications of external ownership for inefficient public input provision.

Pandering Politicians? Targeted Economic Development Incentives and Voter Response

Empirical evidence largely suggests that the billions of dollars state and local governments spend on targeted economic development incentive (EDI) programs are typically ineffective at stimulating broad economic activity. The continued use of EDIs by public officials has thus led scholars to investigate the role of these programs in political pandering. In this paper, we explore the relationship between EDIs and gubernatorial elections in Arkansas. Specifically, we investigate whether officials strategically allocate discretionary EDIs based on previous county-level gubernatorial election outcomes. We subsequently explore the impact of discretionary EDIs on an incumbent party’s bid for gubernatorial reelection at the county level. Our results largely suggest that public officials do not allocate EDIs based on previous election outcomes. Moreover, our results indicate that voters are unresponsive to both the quantity and magnitude of credit claiming messages.

Masquerading the Government: Drivers of Government Impersonation Fraud

This article uniquely examines the drivers of government impersonation across US states. Government impersonation is a relatively new white-collar crime that is slowly being recognized by policy makers and largely ignored by researchers. Results show that it is the decentralized government structure, rather than government size, that significantly affects government impersonation. Greater diffusion of the Internet and economic freedom also contribute to impersonation fraud, while urbanization has a mitigating effect. The share of elderly residents, democratic governorships, or the distance of a state from the nation’s capital did not appreciably impact government impersonation but impacted overall fraud. Interestingly, greater enforcement employment results in more fraud coming to light. Some of the factors impacting government impersonation fraud differ from those affecting overall fraud. Therefore, blanket policies to combat overall fraud would not necessarily be effective in checking government impersonation.

Implications of a Mortgage Interest Credit for the United States

The US mortgage interest deduction (MID) allows homeowners to deduct the interest paid on their mortgages from their federal tax returns, provided that they itemize deductions. Since the benefit depends on a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, which increases with income, the MID is an “upside-down subsidy” that becomes more valuable for higher-income homeowners. I analyze the implications of converting the US MID to a mortgage interest credit (MIC) and evaluate the effects on federal revenue and the distribution of income. I argue that a MIC could be better targeted at low- and middle-income taxpayers on the margin of homeownership while also being more progressive and less expensive than the current MID.

How Does a Reduction in Mandated Medicaid Spending Affect Local Fiscal Behaviors? Evidence from New York State

In 2005, New York (NY) state capped the growth of county-level Medicaid spending, which abruptly decreased counties’ Medicaid outlay in both relative and absolute terms. This study exploits this discontinuity in county Medicaid outlay to estimate the impact of the relief mandate policy on county budgets and property tax levies. It bridges a gap in the public finance literature by addressing local government responses to a sudden decrease in the outlay of a large mandatory spending category. We find a compositional change but no income effect on non-Medicaid spending. However, the policy reduced the effective property tax rate significantly by 6.6 to 8.1 percent on average among affected NY counties after the enactment of the policy relative to control counties. This study advances our understanding of local fiscal responses to an intergovernmental fiscal policy that changes how state and local governments share the costs of a large public social insurance program.

A Replication of “Weathering Corruption” ( Journal of Law and Economics, 2008)

Previous research using data on convictions for corruption-related crimes from the Public Integrity Section (PIN) of the Department of Justice points to a positive correlation between the amount of corruption in a state and the amount of federal funds provided to the state for natural disaster relief. We take a closer look at the relationship between public corruption and disaster assistance and find little support for the hypothesis that the provision of federal disaster aid increases public corruption. Our analysis suggests instead that prior evidence of such a link arises from an unexplained correlation during the 1990s between disaster aid and convictions of postal employees for crimes such as stealing mail. Convictions for postal service crimes appear to account for a large fraction of the total federal convictions reported by PIN, which could have far-reaching implications, given that the PIN data have been used so extensively in the corruption literature.

A Reply to a Replication of “Weathering Corruption” ( Journal of Law and Economics, 2008): Different Data Produce Different Results

Cordis and Milyo replicate our study, which found a positive relationship between FEMA-provided disaster relief and public corruption in the US states. Our study used the corruption data that virtually every study of American corruption uses: PIN data. Using the same data, Cordis and Milyo find the same result. And using different corruption data from TRAC, they find a different result: no relationship between FEMA-provided disaster relief and public corruption. Unsurprisingly, different data produce different results. The meaning of that difference, however, is unclear, especially since the latter result, which implies that public actors do not respond rationally to incentives when making decisions regarding corrupt activities, contradicts the law of demand.

Reply to Conway, Brewer, and Rork (2021)

Conway, Brewer, and Rork (CBR) have done a thorough reproduction and replication of Reed. Their analysis extending the time period that I used, while applying the same empirical procedures, convincingly demonstrates that the estimated effect of taxes on state-level economic growth has declined in recent years. In this reply, I reflect on the capacity of the regression procedures used by CBR, Reed, and others to identify causal effects of taxes on economic growth at the state level. I identify challenges to causal inference that make it difficult to translate these findings to advise for policy makers.