Administrative Legislation Procedures, Pre-Notices, Listening to Opinions under the Administrative Law of the United States - Focusing on the Analysis of the 2019 Ruling, Federal Supreme Court Azar v. Allina Health Service, 587 U.S. 1804 -

In October 2003 in Melbourne, the High Court of Australia celebrated the centenary of its first sitting. According to the Australian Constitution, it is the “Federal Supreme Court” of the Australian Commonwealth.1 Although the Constitution envisaged the establishment of the High Court, the first sitting of the new court did not take place until a statute had provided for the court and the appointment of its first Justices. They took their seats in a ceremony held in the Banco Court in the Supreme Court of Victoria on 6 October 1903. Exactly a century later, the present Justices assembled in the same courtroom for a sitting to mark the first century of the Court.

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Resolving ALJ Removal Protections Problem Following Lucia

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform ◽

10.36646/mjlr.53.3.resolving ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 693

Author(s):

Spencer Davenport

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Supreme Court ◽

Supreme Court Decision ◽

The United States ◽

Administrative Law ◽

Central Issue ◽

Court Decision ◽

Peremptory Challenge ◽

The Supreme Court ◽

The Status

When the Supreme Court decided Lucia v. SEC and held that administrative law judges (ALJs) are Officers under the Constitution, the Court opened a flood of constitutional issues around the status of ALJs and related government positions. One central issue relates to ALJs’ removal protections. ALJs currently have two layers of protection between them and the President. In an earlier Supreme Court decision, the Court held that two layers of tenure protection between an “Officer of the United States” and the President was unconstitutional as it deprived the President the power to hold his officers accountable. As impartial adjudicators, ALJs need those layers of protection to ensure fair adjudicative hearings. Lucia now threatens ALJ protections. This Note argues that implementing a peremptory challenge system which would allow each party in an adjudicative hearing to remove the ALJ from hearing its case would create an avenue in which the Court could justify the removal issue. Such a proposal would fix executive oversight concerns about the President being unable to properly implement his policy. Additionally, peremptory challenges would allow litigants in front of an agency be able to remove ALJs they feel are predisposed to the agency. By addressing both constitutional issues, the Court may be more likely to find that the two layers of tenure protection in place are permissible for those in adjudicatory positions.

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17 The United States Supreme Court and Administrative Law

Current Legal Problems ◽

10.1093/clp/4.1.395 ◽

1951 ◽

Vol 4 (1) ◽

pp. 395-415

Author(s):

Bernard Schwartz

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Supreme Court ◽

United States Supreme Court ◽

The United States ◽

Administrative Law ◽

United States Supreme

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Could This Supreme Court Case Affect Robert Mueller?

10.31228/osf.io/7c9y2 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Peter M. Shane

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Supreme Court ◽

Chief Executive ◽

The United States ◽

Administrative Law ◽

Securities And Exchange Commission ◽

Court Case ◽

Supreme Court Case ◽

Good Cause ◽

At Will

This article examines the then-pending Supreme Court case of Raymond J. Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission, and its possible implications for Robert Mueller. At issue in Lucia is the question of whether SEC Administrative Law Judges are “officers” or “employees” of the United States. More precisely, Lucia is arguing that SEC Administrative Law Judges—who are appointed by the Chief Administrative Law Judge—are officers of the United States who constitutionally may be appointed only by the president or by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Implicated in this case is the question of whether administrative law judges must be dischargeable at will or whether, as is now the case, they may be fired only for “good cause.” Fundamentally, whittling away at administrative independence from the president could embolden both President Trump and his advisors to aggressively advocate for a strong “unitary-executive” presidency under which the chief executive is entitled to fire at will any “Officers of the United States”—including Robert Mueller.

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Means And Ends In City Of Arlington v. FCC: Ignoring The Lawyer's Craft to Reshape the Scope of Chevron Deference

University of Pittsburgh Law Review ◽

10.5195/lawreview.2015.332 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 76 (3) ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Michael P. Healy

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Supreme Court ◽

Judicial Review ◽

United States Supreme Court ◽

The United States ◽

Administrative Law ◽

United States Supreme ◽

Administrative Action ◽

Means And Ends ◽

Chief Justice

In last year’s term, the United States Supreme Court considered the question of the scope of Chevron deference in City of Arlington v. FCC. This article discusses how the decision is an example of the work of an activist Court. The case should have been resolved by a straight forward determination under the analysis of United States v. Mead that Chevron deference simply did not apply to the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) legal determination. The Court ignored this restrained approach to the case and instead addressed the question the Justices desired to decide: the reach of Chevron deference. The article discusses and criticizes the approach of Justice Scalia writing for the majority and of Chief Justice Roberts writing for three dissenting Justices.Practitioners and scholars of administrative law can only be confused by the Court’s willingness to apply Chevron in City of Arlington, given the informal administrative action being reviewed and the fact that neither reviewing court actually applied each of the two parts of the Mead test. The Court’s flawed administrative law analysis results from the activist concerns of Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts. Justice Scalia uses the case as a vehicle to undermine Mead, a decision that Justice Scalia loathes. Chief Justice Roberts uses the case as a vehicle to advocate for less judicial deference and less law defining power for increasingly powerful agencies. Neither member of the Court allowed the applicable rules of contemporary administrative law to hinder his efforts to achieve his broader goals. Administrative law would have been better served if a properly restrained Court had considered and applied the previously determined rules for judicial review of administrative agencies.

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