Understanding of “Feeling” and “Self-Consciousness” on the Border of the XIX–XX Centuries and M. Loewy’s Concept of Depersonalization

The aim was to review the understanding of the phenomena of “feeling” and “self-consciousness” in the concepts of the leading European scientists at the second half of XIX — beginning of the XX centuries.Method: H.R. Lotze, I.M. Sechenov, A. Bain, W. Wundt, G. Stoerring, Th. Lipps, K. Oesterreich, E. Kraepelin and some others are analyzed.Conclusion: while Th. Lipps, H.R. Lotze, W. Wundt and K. Oesterreich were striving for strict differentiation of the notions of “sensations” and “feelings”, A. Bain, I.M. Sechenov, G. Stoerring were not following an effi cient distinction of these phenomena. H.R. Lotze, I.M. Sechenov, A. Bain distinguished in the consciousness and self-consciousness the affective and intellectual components; Th. Lipps considered as the core of self-consciousness the feelings that were very manifold and accompanied different mental acts including the act of perception: “perceptions feeling”. G. Stoerring paid attention to the lack of the feeling of activity by depersonalization, and the Austrian psychiatrist and neurologist M. Loewy elaborated the concept of “ubiquitous” “action feelings” (Actionsgefuehle) that exist outside of “pleasure — displeasure” modality. According to M. Loewy’s concept every mental act is accompanied normally by two “feelings of act”: general and specifi c, in the abnormal case one or both of them may disappear. The clinical description of weakening or loss of the action feelings: impulse feeling, perception feeling of vital sensation, perception feelings of sensations from organs of sense, “feelings of the feeling process”, “thinking feeling”, M. Loewy accomplished by “personalizing” approach to the account of one of his patient, Russian female student. M. Loewy considered the depersonalization disorders in this case as a symbolic neurosis according to S. Freud and as a psychasthenia according to P. Janet. Although E. Kraepelin defi ned selfconsciousness as merely cognitive phenomenon he interpreted depersonalization as a kind of emotional disturbance including the disorders on the level of sensations in the frames of light depressive phase of the manic-depressive illness. The M. Loewy’s concept of the “action feelings” can be applied not only for the understanding of “neurotic” depersonalization but also for depersonalization cases on the ground of depressive and mixed phase affective states.