scholarly journals The Computational Complexity of Nash Equilibria

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet Rosenbaum
Keyword(s):  
Computational Complexity ◽  
Marked Improvement ◽  
Nash Equilibria

Although the computation of Nash equlibria for general games is of unknown complexity, there exist many algorithms for specific game classes, some of which are a marked improvement of previous algorithms. This paper reviews general results on the computational complexity of Nash equilibria and discusses the major algorithms for specific game classes.

scholarly journals On the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for bimatrix games

2005 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 145-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Codenotti ◽  
Daniel Štefankovič
Keyword(s):  
Computational Complexity ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Bimatrix Games

A Modified Chair Geometry for Whole Body Counting

1976 ◽  
Vol 15 (05) ◽  
pp. 246-247
Author(s):  
S. C. Jain ◽  
G. C. Bhola ◽  
A. Nagaratnam ◽  
M. M. Gupta
Keyword(s):  
Marked Improvement ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Whole Body ◽  
Spatial Response ◽  
Body Counting ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Whole Body Counting ◽  
The Buddha

SummaryIn the Marinelli chair, a geometry widely used in whole body counting, the lower part of the leg is seen quite inefficiently by the detector. The present paper describes an attempt to modify the standard chair geometry to minimise this limitation. The subject sits crossed-legged in the “Buddha Posture” in the standard chair. Studies with humanoid phantoms and a volunteer sitting in the Buddha posture show that this modification brings marked improvement over the Marinelli chair both from the point of view of sensitivity and uniformity of spatial response.

A Theory of Patronized Goods: Inefficient and Efficient Equilibria

2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Policy ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Social Motivation ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Equilibrium Conditions ◽  
Policy Issues

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.

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