On the existence of Nash equilibria in fuzzy generalized discontinuous games with infinite players

2020 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 1721-1736
Author(s):  
Haishu Lu ◽  
Rong Li ◽  
Kai Zhang
2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 362-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhe Yang ◽  
Dawen Meng ◽  
Anqiang Wang

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (03) ◽  
pp. 1750014
Author(s):  
Rabia Nessah ◽  
Raluca Parvulescu

This paper gives existence theorems of pure, Pareto efficient, Nash equilibrium in compact, convex and discontinuous games. These conditions are simple and straightforward to verify. Moreover, the present existence results neither imply nor are implied by the known results in the literature. The results are illustrated by several examples.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 439-470
Author(s):  
Philip J. Reny

We review the discontinuous games literature, with a sharp focus on conditions that ensure the existence of pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria in strategic form games and of Bayes-Nash equilibria in Bayesian games.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (04) ◽  
pp. 1950004
Author(s):  
Rabia Nessah ◽  
Tarik Tazdait

We introduce a new notion of continuity, called quasi-transfer continuity, and show that it is enough to guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria in compact, quasiconcave normal form games. This holds true in a large class of discontinuous games. We show that our result strictly generalizes the pure strategy existence theorem of Carmona [Carmona, G. [2009] An existence result for discontinuous games, J. Econ. Theory 144, 1333–1340]. We also show that our result is neither implied by nor does it imply the existence theorems of Reny [Reny, J. P. [1999] On the existence of pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria in discontinuous games, Econometrica 67, 1029–1056] and Baye et al. [Baye, M. R., Tian, G. and Zhou, J. [1993] Characterizations of the existence of equilibria in games with discontinuous and nonquasiconcave payoffs, Rev. Econ. Studies 60, 935–948].


2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.


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